A Contemporary Interpretation of Mayavada: Advaita Vedanta and the Affirmation of the Material Universe

<p>Mayavada (the doctrine of maya) is the Advaitin explanation of how the infinite Brahman is manifested as the finite material world. Brahman is unchanging and perfect; the locus of the changing and imperfect world. This paper has two aims. The first is to show that mayavada affirms the reality of the material world, despite the claims of Paul Deussen and Prabhu Dutt Sharstri to the contrary. To achieve this end a world-affirming mayavada is formulated based on the metaphysics of Swami Vivekananda, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Sri Aurobindo. The second aim is to show that world-affirming mayavada is a plausible metaphysical position which should be taken seriously in contemporary metaphysical debate. To achieve this some pluralist arguments against nondualism are rejected, and it is explained how world-affirming mayavada is preferable to pluralism when accounting for the ontological problems that arise from limitless decomposition and emergence due to quantum entanglement. Hence the conclusion of this paper will be that mayavada is a plausible metaphysical position which affirms the reality of the material world.</p>

A Contemporary Interpretation of Mayavada: Advaita Vedanta and the Affirmation of the Material Universe

<p>Mayavada (the doctrine of maya) is the Advaitin explanation of how the infinite Brahman is manifested as the finite material world. Brahman is unchanging and perfect; the locus of the changing and imperfect world. This paper has two aims. The first is to show that mayavada affirms the reality of the material world, despite the claims of Paul Deussen and Prabhu Dutt Sharstri to the contrary. To achieve this end a world-affirming mayavada is formulated based on the metaphysics of Swami Vivekananda, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Sri Aurobindo. The second aim is to show that world-affirming mayavada is a plausible metaphysical position which should be taken seriously in contemporary metaphysical debate. To achieve this some pluralist arguments against nondualism are rejected, and it is explained how world-affirming mayavada is preferable to pluralism when accounting for the ontological problems that arise from limitless decomposition and emergence due to quantum entanglement. Hence the conclusion of this paper will be that mayavada is a plausible metaphysical position which affirms the reality of the material world.</p>

Patterns of Physis and the Self-Making Kosmos in Heraclitus

Contemporary Western thinkers recognise the destructive effects of long-standing attitudes of mastery over nature and the dualistic and hierarchical thinking that informs them. Heraclitus’ metaphysical position is ideal for reframing these traditional stances for several reasons: first, Heraclitus’ concept of identity is dynamic and relies on a sophisticated understanding of opposites that recognises ambiguity; secondly, his philosophical position produces a model of truth as multiple rather than univocal; and finally, in Heraclitus’ self-making kosmos, human beings are not separate from the processes of physis but inextricably entangled in them. Heraclitus’ philosophy offers relevant avenues for reimagining contemporary philosophical issues, particularly theories of identity, the multiplicity of truth, and the proper ethical human relation to nature.

Introduction

This introduction makes the case that the avowedly anti-metaphysical stance of many reformers is itself a metaphysical position and proposes a method by which to investigate it. It argues that question ‘What was the metaphysics of the Reformation?’ cannot be addressed using purely historical methods. Instead, it proposes a philosophical-theological approach, suggesting that understandings of being and of causality constitute a useful heuristic lens through which to read Reformation sources with a view to understanding their implied metaphysics. It also outlines the aims of the book and the rationale for focussing on Vermigli as a case study.

Metaphysics in the Reformation

Because the magisterial reformers largely rejected metaphysical discourses, is often assumed that the Protestant Reformation had no metaphysics. However, if metaphysics is understood as the ontological relationship between God and the world, how could any theological work not be at least implicitly metaphysical? This book argues that the avowedly anti-metaphysical stance of many reformers is itself a metaphysical position, and that teasing out the implicit metaphysics in their worldviews is both possible and worthwhile despite – or even because of – their insistent denials that they have any such thing. Metaphysics in the Reformation proposes a novel methodology for studying the implied metaphysics of the Reformation, focussing on implied structures of being and causality. It then applies this methodology to the under-researched work of Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562). Analysing four main areas of Vermigli’s theology – his anthropology, his soteriology, his doctrine of the Eucharist, and his political theology – the book argues that in his theology, Vermigli simultaneously inhabits two different metaphysical models of the relationship between God and the world. The book contends that by extension, this holds true of Reformation theology more generally.

The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review

The article (the publication consists of two parts) presents an analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. This phenomenon is proposed to be analyzed from the viewpoint of historical ontology, which deals with the ontological presuppositions of knowledge and their historical dynamics. In the first part, the author highlights two directions of the historical development of metaphysical problems, one of which expresses the immediate metaphysical position, and the other represents the criticism of this position. The author associates criticism of metaphysics with the development of science and the philosophy of science. The author shows the difference between the “analytical” and “continental” approaches to metaphysical problems. The consideration of metaphysics as a historical phenomenon is associated with Hegel’s metaphilosophical historicism. The alternative, non-historical, consideration of metaphysics is placed in the context of empiricism and positivism. The concepts of scientific realism are defined as a kind of positivistically restricted analytical metaphysics. The author highlights three points of growth of post-positivist philosophy and pays special attention to the relationship between post-positivist philosophy of science, history of science, metaphilosophical history of ideas, and sociology of science. The author traces the gradual formation of theoretical conditions for the rehabilitation of metaphysics in these research fields. The author demonstrates that the historicization of Kant’s “transcendental subject” creates a specific epistemological perspective that joins historicism with contextualism. Within this perspective, the question of the ontological presuppositions of empirical (primarily scientific) knowledge, their development and change becomes of great importance.

Freedom, Slavery, and the Passions

In his Ethics, Spinoza uses a republican conception of political liberty as a model for a broader theory of philosophical freedom. According to the republican view, we only live freely when we are not subject to the arbitrary power of other agents. But if we consider our metaphysical position as individuals surrounded by things more powerful than ourselves, it seems that freedom is beyond our reach. We cannot but be subject to the arbitrary power of external things. Spinoza responds to this problem by arguing that, when we reason, we are not acted on by external things and are thus not subject to their arbitrary power. Extending the republican view beyond politics allows him to conclude that philosophizing liberates us.

Organism and environment in Auguste Comte

This article focuses on Auguste Comte’s understanding of the organism–environment relationship. It makes three key claims therein: (a) Comte’s metaphysical position privileged materiality and relativized the intellect along two dimensions: one related to the biological organism, one related to the social environment; (b) this twofold materiality confounds attempts to reduce cognition to either nature or nurture, so Comte’s position has interesting parallels to the field of ‘epigenetics’, which sees the social environment as a causative factor in biology; and (c) although Comte ultimately diverged from the ‘postgenomic’ view in crucial ways, he remains a forerunner of the trend towards viewing the social and biological as entangled. Tending to these dimensions challenges the view that Comte is notable from a classical standpoint but ignorable from a contemporary one. It consequently invites renewed attention to his theoretical system.

The Political Economy Fate of the Ontology of Privately

The logic of the historical development of European culture is directed towards the absolutization of the private side of human existence. Traditional forms of social life are gradually being replaced by the cultivated ideal of a free person who realizes himself in individual entrepreneurial activity. However, consign­ment to oblivion of the generic principles of community life, and sometimes their complete disregard in political programs and philosophical doctrines, threatens to launch a mechanism of a reciprocal “vengeful” response of the com­munal mind. The article discusses of genesis of basic value of the West European culture – a private property. Research suggests to make judgment of this phe­nomenon from a metaphysical position that allows to open the disputable parties of the economical and political theories which are carrying out its universaliza­tion and an ontologization. Making a start from tradition of Parmenides under­standing of being, the arising tension between traditional values of the European spirit and it the developed values of an era of a modernist style is shown, from which value private own became fundamental. During this analysis prospects of creation of libertarian society are depicted and the methodological principle al­lowing recognizing from the philosophical point of view socially accepted these or those social theories is formulated.

The ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in Advaita Vedānta

The paper examines the metaphysical and ethical approaches underlying the image of the self and the other in Advaita Vedānta (hereafter AV). AV examines the nature of the conceptual division between the self and the other, referred to by the terms ‘I’ (asmad) and ‘you’ (yuṣmad) respectively. Behind the mundane expressions of these terms AV identifies superimposition — adhyāsa as a metaphysical precursor, which generates a cognitive error in all such expressions where we use personal pronouns ‘I’ and attributes such as ‘fat’, ‘tall’ etc. thereupon. The position of AV is that the distinction between the self and the other is due to a cognitive error caused by superimposition. In other words, to see differences in reality is ignorance (avidyā). Moreover, if this ignorance is replaced by true knowledge, i.e., knowledge of reality as Advaita, i.e., Non–duality, we shall see the development of a different kind of understanding revealing the underlying unity of self and other. This knowledge of the underlying unity generates a different attitude which dissolves social problems such as socio–political inequality, hatred and violence, etc. grounded in the ‘self’–‘other’ distinction. Like any piece of knowledge, the knowledge of the realization of an underlying non–duality or advaita brings about an attitude change towards reality. In this case, the attitude of taking granted the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘you’ is changed to seeing non–duality in all individuals. However, in principle, since AV advocates non–duality, it cannot meaningfully talk about morality or ethics, since ethics presupposes duality between ‘I’ and ‘you.’ So the challenge is to show that, according to AV, the non–duality of self and other is the source of morality. In addition, an ethics of active love is proposed which is congruent with AV’s metaphysical commitments. The ethics of active love develops when one gives up the idea of differences and identifies oneself with others. It is a well known fact that the root of most social evils is the discrimination between ‘I’ and ‘You’. Moreover, it is the ego (I) that creates a rift between one man and another, and as a result, society suffers from various problems such as violence, hatred, social discrimination and corruption, etc. The conception of the oneness of all beings advocated by AV creates a spirit of love and harmony among individual selves, and this love is the foundation stone of ethics or morality. Taking recourse to the AV’s exposition of the issue, a moral interpretation of the underlying unity of self and other is also intended. The aim of the paper is twofold: 1. To examine and present the metaphysical position of AV vis–à–vis the distinction between self and other. 2. To respond to the problem of the possibility of moral or ethical actions within AV metaphysics with a new kind of morality that is based on the identification of one’s self with others. In other words, an ethics based on and compatible with Advaita metaphysics