Powers in Contemporary Philosophy

Four metaphysicians, Charlie Martin, David Lewis, David Armstrong, and George Molnar, offer distinctive approaches to understanding powers. Martin challenges the widely held view that disposition statements can be eliminated in favor of conditional statements. The apparent failure of the conditional analysis clears the path for Martin’s idea that all properties have some degree of irreducible dispositionality. Lewis takes on Martin’s challenge and offers his reformed conditional analysis. This analysis does not purport to eliminate talk of dispositions, but instead metaphysically reduces dispositions to their causal bases. Armstrong also reduces dispositions, but he reduces them to categorical universals governed by natural laws. Molnar argues that each of the aforementioned views falters when confronted with the powers of fundamental particles, which are said to be ungrounded pure powers. Molnar holds that both fundamental and derivative powers exist alongside non-power spatial and temporal properties. Debates among these four philosophers in the latter half of the 20th century constitute a substantial part of the reemergence of discussion of powers in contemporary metaphysics.

The distinct existences argument revisited

The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than 50 years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity.

Knowledge

This chapter carries out a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of the term pramāṇa. After elucidating his definitions and subsequent Indian interpretations of them, it is argued that we can characterize the standard post-Dharmakīrtian account of knowledge as a novel, truth-tracking cognition. The second half of the chapter explores how this Buddhist account of knowledge compares to analyses of knowledge in the contemporary analytic tradition of epistemology. It is argued, for example, that the Buddhist account cannot be assimilated to analyses of knowledge that appeal to justification, nor to standard versions of reliabilism. Instead, it more closely resembles the theory of knowledge defended by David Armstrong.

The Molecular Turn, Predictive Technologies and Diagnostic Fragmentation: An Interview with David Armstrong

Alan Petersen (AP) and Kiran Pienaar (KP): Thank you, David, for agreeing to share your perspectives in this interview. It is a pleasure and honour to have this opportunity to engage with your insights and scholarly contributions on surveillance medicine and the sociology of diagnosis. Looking back to your early contributions on surveillance medicine, these seem to anticipate recent diagnostic trends. What, if anything, has changed in the interim period?

On Laws of Nature

Natural laws are at the heart of contemporary academic studies. Yet, the basic question on what is accounted as a law is still open to debate among philosophers of science. This paper provides a survey on three representativephilosophical accounts of laws of nature —— the regularity (Humean) account, the necessitarian account by David Armstrong and the best system account of laws by David Lewis. By pointing out the disputes among these views whichstem from the dilemma pointed out by van Frassen – the tension between the problem of inference and the problem of identification, this paper provides a clear way to compare these accounts and a guidance for further research.

What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?

David Armstrong (1983) argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the best explanation and even whether, by Armstrong’s own standards, necessitation relations offer a potential explanation of this explanandum, let alone the best explanation. I defend Armstrong against these particular criticisms. Firstly, even though there are reasons to think that Armstrong’s justification fails as a self-contained defence of induction, it can usefully complement several other answers to Hume. Secondly, I argue that Armstrong’s reasoning is consistent with his own standards for explanation.

Consciência e fenômenos mentais inconscientes: as visões de David Armstrong e John Searle

O artigo examina as concepções de consciência, bem como as concepções de fenômenos mentais inconscientes, de David Armstrong e John Searle. Enquanto Armstrong entende a consciência como decorrente de uma percepção de segunda ordem, de modo que um fenômeno inconsciente é apenas um fenômeno mental que não é percebido, Searle entende a consciência como um estado global, o que torna sua visão do inconsciente mais complicada. Estados mentais inconscientes não passam de padrões de atividade neuronal, padrões que são capazes de causar estados mentais conscientes nas circunstâncias adequadas. Porém, enquanto a teoria de Armstrong é perfeitamente coerente, a visão de Searle se mostra inconsistente, pois a eficácia causal que ele atribui aos fenômenos inconscientes é incompatível com o papel fundamental que ele atribui à consciência no domínio dos fenômenos mentais.

A quasi-regularist view of laws

It will be analyzed some views about laws and highlight certain aspects in each of them that, in our opinion, are to the detriment of their plausibility. The views that we will analyze are the standard regularist conception and the most sophisticated variant known as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) approach, on the one hand, and the necessitarianist versions of David Armstrong and Stephen Mumford, on the other. Finally, we present an alternative proposal that is intermediate between the regularist conception and Mumford’s nomological anti-realism. We believe that our proposal successfully avoids the reviewed difficulties and opens a new theoretical space within the dispute over the laws of nature.

Platonic Laws of Nature

David Armstrong accepted the following three theses: universals are immanent, laws are relations between universals, and laws govern. Taken together, they form an attractive position, for they promise to explain regularities in nature—one of the most important desiderata for a theory of laws and properties—while remaining compatible with naturalism. However, I argue that the three theses are incompatible. The basic idea is that each thesis makes an explanatory claim, but the three claims can be shown to run in a problematic circle. I then consider which thesis we ought to reject (hint: see the title) and suggest some general lessons for the metaphysics of laws.

A consciência como uma percepção do mental e o estatuto dos fenômenos mentais inconscientes na perspectiva de David Armstrong

O artigo examina a teoria de David Armstrong sobre a consciência e sua concepção do inconsciente. Após uma discussão do caráter anti-cartesiano dessa teoria (seção 1), são discutidas as noções de consciência mínima e consciência perceptiva (seção 2), bem como o conceito de consciência introspectiva, que é o mais importante para Armstrong (seção 3). A conclusão é que, apesar do valor explicativo dos seus conceitos de consciência, Armstrong defende uma perspectiva insatisfatória a respeito do inconsciente, pois essa perspectiva não dá conta da real influência do inconsciente em nossa vida mental (seção 4).