The Origins of Supranational State Aid Legislations: What Policymakers Must Know and Adhere to. The Case of Estonia

As an independent country, Estonia can decide on how to promote its economy through state intervention, at least in theory. At the same time, Estonia has been a WTO member since 1999 and an EU Member State since 2004 and must adhere to these rules. Both regimes limit a Member State’s ability to interfere in the economy, setting forth rules on when a state can interfere with consequences if the rules are not met. But these rules differ, and the same situation can have a different result depending on the rules applied. Also, both sets of rules limit the competence of a member country to interfere in economy differently, for example, the WTO applies a rather lenient ex post control while in the EU a strict ex ante control by the Commission is used. Also the consequences for failing to adhere are different. Although one of the smallest EU Member States and represented by the Commission in WTO roundtables, it is still relevant for Estonia to have a position on globally applied state interference measures, and present and protect its views, if needed. To successfully promote its economy nationally and in the EU, Estonian policymakers, like those of any other country in the same position, must know not only the applicable state interference rules but also the underlying principles thereof. The article will provide a historical overview of the framework of the supranational state aid regimes of the WTO and the EU, as well as the domestic rules of Estonia. It is aimed at reflecting the principles behind the state aid rules that the domestic policymakers must consider when designing national state interference measures. The author applies classical research methods, namely, reading and interpretation of texts, but also comparing the WTO, EU and Estonian laws on state subsidies.

Predicting the Rise of EU Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration

Among the central tenets of globalization is the free migration of labor. Although much has been written about the benefits of globalization, little is known about its limitations and how antiglobalist sentiment can be strongly affected by high levels of immigration. Analyzing poll data from a group of EU countries affected by the recent migrant crisis, we find that over the last three years the percentage of right-wing (RW) populist voters in a given country depends on the prevalence of immigrants in this country’s population and the total immigration inflow into the entire EU. The latter is likely due to the perception that the EU functions as a supranational state in which a lack of inner borders means that “someone else’s problem” can easily become “my problem.” We find that the increase in the percentage of RW voters substantially surpasses the percentage of immigration inflow, implying that if this process continues, ongoing democratic processes will cause RW populism to prevail and globalization to rapidly decrease. We locate tipping points between the fraction of immigrants and the rise of RW populism, and we model our empirical findings using a complex network framework in which the success of globalization rests on a balance between immigration and immigrant integration.