Das Ineinandergreifen von Zulagenförderung und Sonderausgabenabzug des Riester-Kombimodells im Lichte einer „Quasi-Doppelbesteuerung“

Zusammenfassung In der zulagengeförderten Altersvorsorge (sog. Riester-Rente) wurde eine staatliche Förderung im progressionsabhängigen und -unabhängigen Kombimodell verankert. Steuerentlastungen, die den höchstmöglichen Zulagenanspruch übersteigen, werden dem Steuerpflichtigen im Rahmen seiner Einkommensteuererklärung angerechnet oder erstattet. Hieraus folgt eine implizite Pflicht zur Ausübung des Wahlrechts auf Beantragung der Altersvorsorgezulage. Handelt der Vorsorgende dieser zuwider, kann sich intertemporal eine steuerliche Mehrbelastung einstellen, da selbst eine marginale steuerliche Förderung von Beiträgen in der Anwartschaftsphase eine vollständige nachgelagerte Besteuerung in der Leistungsphase auslöst. Ein Vorsorgender liefe in diesem Fall Gefahr mit seinen Rentenleistungen einem Risiko der „Quasi-Doppelbesteuerung“ zu unterliegen. Dieses Risiko gilt es vonseiten des Gesetzgebers zu eliminieren. Abstract: The Intertwining of Allowance and Special Expenses Deduction of the Riester Hybrid Model in Light of a “Quasi Double Taxation” In the German subsidised pension scheme (so-called Riester pension), a state subsidy has been implemented in a progressive and non-progressive hybrid model. Tax reliefs exceeding the maximum allowance entitlement will be taken into account or reimbursed as part of the taxpayer’s income tax return. As a ­result, the taxpayer is implicitly obliged to exercise the option to apply for the Riester allowance. In case he fails to do so, he has to face the risk of an intertemporal additional tax burden, since even the slightest of subsidisations in the entitlement period leads to full liability for deferred taxation in the pension period. This case bears the risk of pension payments being subject to a “quasi double taxation”. It is necessary for the legislation to eliminate this risk.

Tax Misperceptions and the Effect of Informational Tax Nudges on Retirement Savings

Despite subjects being informed about tax rules before making saving decisions, we find—using laboratory experiments—that deferred taxation results in after-tax pensions that are approximately 25% lower compared with an economically equivalent immediate pension-tax system. This indicates substantial tax misperceptions. For subjects with low tax knowledge, tax misperceptions remain stable, even if they have gained experience. Tax misperceptions nearly disappear for all subjects only if we provide recurrent numerical informational pension-tax nudges and if subjects have gained experience. We demonstrate that replacing the tax-deductibility of retirement savings with government matching contributions increases after-tax pensions above the level under immediate taxation without the need to provide informational tax nudges. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis.

The Effects of Income Tax Timing on Retirement Investment Decisions

In an online experiment, the immediate (Roth) versus deferred taxation of retirement income affects taxpayers' investment decisions such that tax-deferred plan investors under-adjust for future tax burdens and overestimate their future wealth compared to Roth investors. When presented with a specific, after-tax monetary goal, Roth account holders invest more in higher-risk, higher-return assets than tax-deferred account holders. We investigate four aspects of this investment context that could alleviate these differences: 1) implementing a "do-your-best" goal, 2) reframing specific goals in pre-tax dollars, 3) explicitly prompting investors to estimate future tax burdens, and 4) providing performance feedback. These interventions reduce differences between Roth and tax-deferred investor behaviors, but do not entirely close the gap on their own. In combination, reframing goals and prompting future tax estimations encourage tax-deferred account holders to invest in risky assets to the same degree as Roth investors only when paired with performance feedback.