In this paper we present the main psychological conceptions of rationality:
unbounded rationality, bounded rationality, optimization under constraints,
and ecological rationality. We show how these concepts directed the research
questions, and how they shaped psychological models of complex cognitive
processes. In its symbolic tradition, for more than a century, the
psychology, as a fundamental cognitive science, has been focused on the
question of how the environment is represented in the cognitive system, how
the cognitive system operates with those information, and, ultimately, what
are the outcomes of these processes. The basis on which the research efforts
focusing on complex cognitive processes, such as judgment, decision-making,
and reasoning - are rooted in is the stance of authors, and psychological
models regarding rationality. The conceptualizations of rationality are, at
the beginning of the psychological research, implicit, because they are taken
from a normative approach, and the research focus is on the outcome of
cognitive processes, while the functions and the processes themselves are
neglected. Later, as the research diverge from the normative approach, the
psychological conceptualization of rationality becomes more explicit and
subjective, and more nested in the environment, and the empirical studies aim
to describe the structure and dynamics of complex cognitive processes.