operation desert storm
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2021 ◽  
pp. 159-188
Author(s):  
Kevin Winkler

The Will Rogers Follies was Tune’s most opulent show, far different from the sleek, stylized minimalism of his recent musicals, with a score by Cy Coleman (music) and Betty Comden and Adolph Green (lyrics), and a book by Peter Stone, by this time a frequent Tune collaborator. The story of Will Rogers, the beloved, Oklahoma-born star of radio, vaudeville, and films, and one of the most popular headliners of the Ziegfeld Follies, was told as a series of routines played out on the stage of the Follies. This look back at a bygone theatrical era played to Tune’s strengths, and his staging recalled show business antecedents from the stage and screen updated with present-day flourishes. Tune’s staging feats were even more impressive because they were performed on a grand staircase that covered the entire expanse of the stage. The Will Rogers Follies opened during a moment of resurgent patriotism in the wake of the success of Operation Desert Storm. Following a decade in which British hits like Cats, Les Misérables, and The Phantom of the Opera dominated the Broadway musical, an air of jingoism and a determination to reclaim Broadway for American musicals hovered over the success of The Will Rogers Follies in 1991.


Author(s):  
Fred Allison

When Iraqi military forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation went to war on short notice and in a big way. More than 40 squadrons deployed to the Persian Gulf to participate in Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990–17 January 1991), a buildup of troops in Saudi Arabia by a Coalition of 35 nations led by the United States, and Operation Desert Storm (17 January–28 February 1991), the combat phase of the Coalition’s campaign to liberate Kuwait. Desert Storm tested new Marine aviation procedures, doctrine, equipment, weapons, aircraft, and training that had been introduced after the end of the Vietnam War almost two decades earlier. It also tested a new Joint way of fighting that was established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.


2020 ◽  
pp. 119-149
Author(s):  
Wallace J. Thies

This chapter evaluates the positions taken and the arguments made by observers of Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the decade-long interval between the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the US invasion of Iraq) in 2003. It focuses on the clash of views between those who believed that Hussein's Iraq could not be contained at a reasonable cost as long as Saddam himself remained on the scene (containment pessimists), and those who believed that containment was both feasible and sustainable, because the great disparity in resources between the United States and Iraq meant that the United States could pressure Iraq for years to come, if need be, without resorting to drastic methods, such as withdrawal or a resort to open warfare (containment optimists). To buttress their case, containment pessimists argued that containment could not be counted on to last indefinitely because of the asymmetry between what was at stake for Saddam and his regime, and for the United States and its allies, in the years after Iraq's defeat in the first Persian Gulf War (1990–91). For Saddam Hussein and the rest of his repressive apparatus, the stakes were nothing less than survival. Optimists, on the other hand, conceded that containment was not perfect, but in their view perfection was not needed to bring down Saddam and his regime.


Author(s):  
David P. Oakley

The attention given General Norman Schwarzkopf’s comments on intelligence shortfalls and the concepts developed to support military operations resulted in Operation Desert Storm being a catalyst for changes in the DoD/CIA relationship. Although similar critiques of intelligence were heard following Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, the Desert Storm critiques received more attention and resulted in significant policy and organizational changes. Desert Storm also introduced technologies and concepts that became prominent following 9/11. Concepts such as “fusion center” and “operationalization of intelligence” surfaced during Desert Storm. These concepts matured following 9/11, when the length and type of operations made them necessary and technology made them possible. Desert Storm–era professionals deserve credit for strengthening the intelligence and operations link while also weakening service and interagency parochialism. Intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm was not error free, but intelligence professionals deserve credit for their effort, ingenuity, teamwork, and support.


Author(s):  
Shawn Malley

This chapter develops the central thesis of Chapter 1, namely that paramilitary archaeology is a means of invoking then containing dangerous pasts as an imaginative extension of U.S. foreign policy. Aired in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, Stargate (1994) translates the colonial milieu of 1930s Egyptology to the science fictional terrain of Abydos and the battle against Ra. But the shift to the small screen's televisual identity is symptomatic of the deepening complexities of representing geopolitical activity in the region. Just as archaeology passes from a source of wonder into a vehicle for military adventure, the show's ideological commitments to global (read intra-galactic) security become increasingly destabilized, particularly in the Mesopotamian-themed episodes aired after 9/11. The mercurial figure of Babylon offers a counterpoint to the film's overlay of archaeology and militarism, and indeed to the rhetoric of military stewardship at the heart of the "military-archaeology complex." The shifting representation of Mesopotamian antiquity in SG-1's ten-year run (1997-2007) offers powerful cultural criticism of the show's own premise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-132
Author(s):  
Khoushnaw Tillo

Abstract For centuries, Kurds have been carrying out activities aimed at obtaining their own state. Due to the cooperation of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, it was impossible in the twentieth century. As a result of Operation Desert Storm, a Kurdish enclave was created in the north of Iraq, which over the years developed and allowed for real dreams of recognized independence, at least for some of the Kurds living in the Middle East. A&er the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011, there was a political vacuum in which we observe the weakening of the Iraqi state, the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the emergence of the Islamic State, which also had direct consequences for the Kurds. The weakness of the central government in Baghdad, the need to fight the Kurdish army against IS fighters raised the importance of arguments for the proclamation of an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East, or maybe even two, including the possible division of Syria.


Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg

This chapter deals with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990). This was the beginning of a new conflict in which the Iraqi Armed Forces were involved that included three stages: the occupation of Kuwait, the preparations towards the anticipated conflict with the coalition countries; and the war itself, “The Mother of all Battles” War (Operation Desert Storm), January - February, 1991 and ended with the absolute defeat of the Iraqi Army and its expulsion from Kuwait. It describes the first stage of the conflict, the Iraqi plans to conquer Kuwait in the 60th, the Kuwaiti crisis and the Iraqi decision to take Kuwait, the planning and preparing for the operation, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by the Republican Guard forces.


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