Sentential operators – their interaction (with vectors of time, causality and epistemic relevance) and their constructions

The paper starts by briefly describing the so‐called truth‐functional approach to sentential operators, typical to logic, as opposed to the more multi‐faceted approach of linguistics. The latter reflects the more complex, substantial relations between the contents of utterances, emphasizing the logico‐semantical relations and functions of sentential operators. However, as an alternative to the pragmatically inclined critique of the truth‐functional approach, the paper proposes two possible directions of explaining the specific content of sentential operators by virtue of which they transcend the role of mere truth functions. Firstly, the paper summarizes our previous investigations into the interactions between sentential operators and (1) the vector of the course of events described by a compound sentence, and (2) the direction of grammatical time captured by a compound sentence. The paper focuses on how this interaction is coordinated with the particular epistemic goal (prediction, explanation etc.) pursued when using the meaning of a complex sentence. Using the concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions, and by characterizing the vectors of condition (the if‐vector), time and relevance (dominance or the epistemic vector), the paper demarcates the rules of correspondence for conditional operators as cases of combinatorics, as described by some linguists. Secondly, based on a distinction between different constructions the same operators as truth‐functions, the paper provides a logico‐semantical explanation of the specific meaning of the else, unless and although connectives, traditionally discussed by linguists. We believe that the extensions proposed here move the camp defending a logico‐semantic approach to sentential operators at least somewhat closer to the camp of linguistic investigation.

Judicial decisions, intellectual virtues and the division of labour

In this paper I argue that, given that one epistemic goal of judicial decision-making is to reach reasonably plausible decisions, the divisions of epistemic and cognitive labour help processes of judicial decision-making to better promote that goal under certain conditions. Those conditions concern the possession of a certain intellectual character (in particular, a humble and autonomous character) by the subjects exploiting those divisions of labour and the existence of a certain diversity among those subjects. So, in order to better promote reasonably plausible decisions, we should take measures that make it likely that those divisions of labour are exploited under those conditions. Given this, some prescriptive recommendations are made.

Rejoinder: More Limitations of Bayesian Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation

We recently discussed several limitations of Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation (LOO) for model selection. Our contribution attracted three thought-provoking commentaries. In this rejoinder, we address each of the commentaries and identify several additional limitations of LOO-based methods such as Bayesian stacking. We focus on differences between LOO-based methods versus approaches that consistently use Bayes' rule for both parameter estimation and model comparison. We conclude that LOO-based methods do not align satisfactorily with the epistemic goal of mathematical psychology.

The Costs of Epistemic Realism

This chapter considers some neglected costs of epistemic realism. It argues that those responding to the realist’s main argument against epistemic expressivism—the so-called perspective objection—have overestimated the power of that argument, since a central premise of it can actually be used to turn the tables on the realist. More specifically, the premise entails that, unless the realist accepts a far-reaching scepticism, she must do two things. First, she must reject the idea that true belief is a central epistemic goal. Second, she must hold that the diversity of views in discussions about epistemic normativity is a sign of cognitive-behavioural incoherence, if not of widespread irrationality, on the part of epistemologists. Such are the costs of epistemic realism.

ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION

Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall callUr-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension withEvidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent’s evidence may entail nontrivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is incompatible withEvidence Externalism. I go on to suggest that even if we don’t acceptEvidence Externalism, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification forUr-Prior Conditionalizationare bleak.

Know-how as Competence

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one's acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined.

MORE ON THE GETTIER PROBLEM AND LEGAL PROOF:

In “The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,” I argue that epistemic conditions that undermine knowledge in Gettier-type cases also potentially undermine legal verdicts. For this reason, I argue, there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically presupposed or argued for in the scholarly legal literature. To support these claims, I present several examples illustrating how conditions that render epistemically justified beliefs merely accidentally true (and thus disqualify them as cases of genuine knowledge) may also render evidentially well-supported verdicts merely accidentally true for similar reasons. Such “Gettierized” verdicts, I contend, fail to realize the epistemic goal or aim of legal proof. Thus I conclude there, legal proof includes something like a knowledge requirement—in the sense that legal verdicts aim not only at truth and sufficient evidential support but also, as with knowledge, at an appropriate connection between their truth and justifying evidential support.

Seeking the Truth and Taking Care for Common Goods–Plato on Expertise and Recognizing Experts

ABSTRACTIn this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise.