scholarly journals A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

Author(s):  
Peter G. Moffatt ◽  
Graciela Zevallos

AbstractWe consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michelle Brock ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Erkut Y Ozbay

We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand

We investigate whether experience playing the Dictator Game (DG) affects prosociality by aggregating data from 37 experiments run on Amazon Mechanical Turk over a six-year period. While prior evidence has shown a correlation between experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk and selfishness, it is unclear to what extent this is the result of selection versus learning. Examining a total of 27,266 decisions made by 17,791 unique individuals, our data shows evidence of significant negative effects of both selection and learning. First, people who participated in a greater total number of our experiments were more selfish, even in their first game – indicating that people who are more likely to select into our experiments are more selfish. Second, a given individual tends to transfer less money over successive experiments – indicating that experience with the DG leads to greater selfishness. These results provide clear evidence of learning even in this non-strategic social setting.


Author(s):  
Arne Risa Hole

This article describes the mixlogit Stata command for fitting mixed logit models by using maximum simulated likelihood.


Author(s):  
Chao Yang ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yuhui Wang ◽  
Xuemeng Zhang ◽  
Yong Liu ◽  
...  

Understanding the new mechanism of altruistic behavior is pivotal to people’s health and social development. Despite the rich literature on altruism, this is the first study exploring the association between the sense of community responsibility (SOC-R) and altruistic behavior by repeated dictator games. Data were gathered from 95 residents (30% male; M age = 33.20 years). Demographic variables, money motivation, and SOC-R were measured. The results revealed that there was a significant positive correlation between SOC-R and altruistic behavior, and SOC-R had a positive predictive effect on residents’ altruistic behavior. With the increasing of the number of tasks assigned, the level of residents’ altruistic behavior gradually decreased. There was a significant difference in money allocation between the groups with high and low levels of SOC-R. The level of altruistic behavior in the group with a high level of SOC-R was significantly higher than that in the the group with a low level of SOC-R. Findings from the present study highlighted the potential value of strengthening residents’ SOC-R in the improvement of altruism. Implications and directions for future research were also discussed.


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