Knowledge-Based Stable Roommates Problem: A Real-World Application

The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a matching that is stable and, sometimes, optimizes a domain-independent fairness criterion (e.g. Egalitarian). However, in real-world applications (e.g. assigning students as roommates at a dormitory), we usually consider a variety of domain-specific criteria depending on preferences over the habits and desires of the agents. With this motivation, we introduce a knowledge-based method to SRTI considering domain-specific knowledge and investigate its real-world application for assigning students as roommates at a university dormitory.

Subjective Homophily and the Fixtures Problem

The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.