Subjective Homophily and the Fixtures Problem
Keyword(s):
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.
2005 ◽
Vol 95
(4)
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pp. 913-935
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2020 ◽
Vol 34
(02)
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pp. 1830-1837
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2019 ◽
Vol 31
(6)
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pp. 1237-1259
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1993 ◽
Vol 2
(1)
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pp. 53-92
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