intelligence collection
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2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Calder Walton

Abstract Protests against racism erupt in cities across America. A White House, under siege, believes a vast conspiracy is at work, and, to uncover it, instigates a policy to spy on Americans. This is not the United States in 2020, but half a century earlier. Using a wealth of declassified records, this article explores a domestic intelligence collection program (CHAOS) instigated by two successive US administrations and conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By studying this historical chapter, we observe how quickly an agency, equipped with intrusive powers, can infringe on Americans’ civil liberties when tasked by a US president. Applying this case to our contemporary context, this article argues that robust whistleblower procedures, as well as informal oversight, are powerful defenses against such abuses. Understanding why CHAOS occurred is an essential public policy first step to prevent similar abuses happening again.


Author(s):  
Karen Howells

Social media platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries. The data available from social media networks has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries. This article features an overview of the use of social media platforms in facilitating civil unrest, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations' data output. Further programming would allow these socialbots to interact with a target and would be able to disseminate propaganda for the intelligence agencies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 1780-1785
Author(s):  
Rose Bernard ◽  
Gemma Bowsher ◽  
Richard Sullivan

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a significant growth in government surveillance techniques globally, primarily through the use of cell phone applications. However, although these applications can have actionable effects on public health efforts to control pandemics, the participatory or voluntary nature of these measures is obscuring the relationship between health information and traditional government surveillance techniques, potentially preventing effective oversight. Public health measures have traditionally been resistant to the integration of government-led intelligence techniques, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), because of ethical and legal issues arising from the nature of surveillance techniques. We explore this rise of participatory SIGINT and its nature as an extension of biosurveillance through 3 drivers: the rise of surveillance capitalism, the exploitation of a public health crisis to obscure state of exception politics with a moral imperative, and the historically enduring nature of emergency-implemented surveillance measures. We conclude that although mobile applications may indeed be useful in containing pandemics, they should be subject to similar oversight and regulation as other government intelligence collection techniques.


2020 ◽  
pp. 341-360
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

Spying on secretive dictatorships is difficult. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was, in the run up to the first Gulf War, a very hard target. This chapter examines how the CIA tried to overcome this problem. It examines the US’s engagement with Saddam Hussain and Iraq from the 1970s, and considers how the CIA understood Saddam following his rise to power in 1979. It culminates with Desert Storm, and how a mix of technical intelligence collection and analysis changed opinions about the likelihood Iraq invading neighbouring Kuwait. Document: Iraq’s Saddam Husayn: The Next Six Weeks


2020 ◽  
pp. 156-170
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

The chapter opens with an overview of how technological development has developed to allow US intelligence to acquire insight to support counter proliferation efforts. The capability of US intelligence became a key asset in agreeing international agreements, such as SALT. SALT I is the focus of the chapter. Whilst both the USSR and the US agreed to various limits on their strategic weapons verification that the other was abiding by the terms was to become key issue. Intelligence collection focused on imint and elint was the solution. In this case, intelligence was confidence. Document: Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations.


Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

Taking declassified and publicly available sources this book provides an insight into the evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1947 to the Trump Presidency. Focusing on a mix of case studies historic case studies such as The Berlin Tunnel, and The Cuban Missile Crisis. As well as discussing the internal changes and evolution of the organisation from planning covert actions, to adapting to, using and developing technology to aid in intelligence collection and analysis. The book also talks to key individuals that have shaped the organisation at different points in its history as well as how different Presidents have used the Agency to deliver political decisions. The book is balanced in its presentation of successes and failures, the latter often times more well known: Iraq being perhaps the best known example. The use of declassified documentation elevates this from being another history of the Central Intelligence Agency, into an insightful window into a famous yet secret organisation with a global brand.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-114
Author(s):  
Johannes Ulrich Siebert ◽  
Detlof von Winterfeldt

To develop effective counterterrorism strategies, it is important to understand the capabilities and objectives of terrorist groups. Much of the understanding of these groups comes from intelligence collection and analysis of their capabilities. In contrast, the objectives of terrorists are less well understood. In this article, we describe a decision analysis methodology to identify and structure the objectives of terrorists based on the statements and writings of their leaders. This methodology was applied in three case studies, resulting in the three objectives hierarchies of al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Hezbollah. In this article, we propose a method to compare the three objectives hierarchies, highlight their key differences, and draw conclusions about effective counterterrorism strategies. We find that all three terrorist groups have a wide range of objectives going far beyond the objective of killing and terrorizing people in the non-Muslim world. Among the shared objectives are destroying Israel and expelling Western powers from the Middle East. All three groups share the ambition to become a leader in the Islamic world. Key distinctions are the territorial ambitions of ISIL and Hezbollah versus the large-scale attack objectives of al-Qaeda. Objectives specific to ISIL are the establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the re-creation of the power of Sunni Islam. Hezbollah has unique objectives related to the establishment of a Palestine State and to maintain the relationship with and support of Iran and Syria. Al-Qaeda’s objectives remain focused on large-scale attacks in the West. We also note a recent shift to provide support for small-scale attacks in the West by both al-Qaeda and ISIL. Our method can be used for comparing objectives hierarchies of different organizations as well as for comparing objectives hierarchies over time of one organization.


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