The direct election of senators and the emergence of the modern presidency

Research on presidential power delineates between a modern era of relative autonomy and an earlier period of congressional dominance. What drove this change? Unlike prior arguments about presidential entrepreneurship and the rise of the United States as a global power, we attribute the emergence of the modern presidency partially to an institutional change—the adoption of direct election of senators that culminated in the 17th Amendment. With direct election, senators were selected by individual voters rather than state legislators. These senators answered to a new principal—the general public—that was (in the aggregate) less informed and less interested in foreign policy. As a result, senators had less incentive to constrain presidential foreign policy preferences. We find evidence for this shift in the relationship between the piecemeal adoption of direct election and senate votes to delegate foreign policy authority to the executive. The implication is that the direct election of senators played an underappreciated role in the emergence of the modern presidency.

Silence Is Consent for the Modern Presidency

This chapter examines the breadth of executive power expansion in the twentieth century. It does this by studying private litigation cases that challenged presidential firings by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt; the landmark “Steel Seizure” case under Harry Truman; financial settlements related to the Iran hostage crisis; the post-9/11 cases of detainee treatment; and the most recent passport case on the U.S. policy toward Israel's capital. In almost all of these private litigation cases, the Supreme Court looked at congressional intention and action to guide their decisions. These precedents help one to understand the most recent legal controversies against President Donald Trump. Wherever federal courts can find Congress's delegation of power, presidents will likely win.

Agency Politicization and the Decline of Neutral Competence: The Case of OMB in the United States

The modern presidency is heavily politicized. The president is expected to be the chief legislator, chief economist, chief psychiatrist, and chief diplomat for the nation and is the cog around which national affairs revolve. However, a politicized presidency signals the downfall of the managerial presidency that was buttressed by agencies with neutral competence. This article traces the evolution of an American budgetary agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) from its inception to the present, documenting the baleful impact of the politicized presidency on the OMB. Amid politicization, the OMB lost its professional reputation for neutral competence and was replaced by the Congressional Budget Office as the foremost authority on national budgetary matters. This article, in essence, presents a cautionary tale of agency politicization in modern bureaucracy.