Sentencing Federal Drug Offenders

The Drug War ushered in harsh sentencing practices in the United States. The severity in penalties has been particularly salient in the federal criminal justice system. Increased statutory penalties and U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines led to drug users and traffickers serving longer periods of incarceration. As a result, the federal correctional system is overburdened. A noticeable change in attitude is evident. Congress has offered leniency for certain first-time drug offenders in the form of a statutory safety valve. While a progressive step, the safety valve applies to relatively few individuals. Importantly, federal judges have some discretion to reject what they might consider to be overly lengthy sentencing mandates. This Article provides an empirical study of sentencing statistics for drug offences. The sample derives from the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s fiscal year 2019 dataset of over 20,000 cases sentenced for drug crimes. Results show that judges employed various mechanisms to reduce statutory- and guidelines-based penalties. Strategies by judges include avoiding mandatory minimums (using the safety valve and otherwise), giving greater point reductions than permitted, and rejecting Commission policies. Over 60% of sentences were below the guidelines’ minimum recommendations. The consequences are beneficial in alleviating strain on the federal prison population, but create inconsistency in sentencing practices. A qualitative component supplements the quantitative. Judges, when issuing their statement of reasons for the sentence, may include textual comments. These comments provide valuable contextual information in how judges articulate their concerns with sanctions for drug offenders. Overall results present important policy considerations.

A History of Early Drug Sentences in California

The early history of drug sentences in California provides a quintessential example of structural racism in law. The demands of white voters to escalate penalties for drug crimes followed a pattern of collective myth making and value signaling that insisted opiates, cocaine, and cannabis were extremely dangerous, led to other crime, and prevalently were used and sold by immigrants and other despised groups. Public pressure for more severe punishment seemed to peak twice, in the 1920s and 1950s, in response to exaggerated threats such as “dope peddlers” targeting children and profitable “dope rings” controlled by subversive foreigners. Amplified by a self-seeking, robust news media and a multitude of fraternal, civic, and religious organizations, the frightful construction of illicit drugs seemed to demand a simple and uncompromising response: to punish drug users harder by increasing terms of incarceration. But white voters always understood that drug laws targeted immigrants and communities of color, and law enforcers used extreme penalties as leverage to pursue corrupt and racist prerogatives unrelated to reducing drug use. Drug penalties in California were developed over many decades with almost extreme levels of participation by antidrug activists and law enforcers. Appearing somehow scientific, the resulting arrays of penalties implied that the cruelest sentences were reserved for the truly blameworthy, when in fact they were reserved for the marginalized. Moreover, several legal conventions born of these penalty structures—mandatory minimums, the distinction between user and seller, punishment of addiction itself, and presumptions arising from drug quantities—still exacerbate the oppressive nature of drug statutes.

Mandatory Minimum Reforms, Sentencing, and Racial-Ethnic Disparities

Over the last 20 years, numerous states and the federal government enacted mandatory minimum reforms, especially for drug offenses. Yet little is known about how effective these reforms have been at the state-level in lowering drug sentences. Using quasi-experimental methods and administrative data, this study evaluates the impact of state-level mandatory minimum reforms on drug sentences and their concomitant racial-ethnic disparities. We find that state-level mandatory minimum reforms do not lower drug sentences in general or change racial-ethnic disparities statistically significantly. These findings suggest that the profound racial-ethnic bias sparked by state-level mandatory minimums are not fully ameliorated by subsequent state-level reforms.

The Challenge of Imposing Just Sentences Under Mandatory Minimum Statutes: A Qualitative Study of Judicial Perceptions

Mandatory minimums limit judicial discretion in many jurisdictions in the United States, often compelling judges to impose harsh incarcerative terms. Using qualitative interviews with 41 criminal term judges presiding in a state in the United States, we explore how mandatory minimums influence the judicial sentencing function. We find that judges vary in their approaches to sentencing and that their approaches correspond with their perceptions of mandatory minimum statutes. While our respondents consider case-level, systemic, and pragmatic factors, the majority of judges are focused on the case level and perceive that mandatory minimums often strip away the flexibility they need to craft appropriate sentences in individual cases, leading to punishments that are unduly harsh, and sometimes preventing the imposition of promising alternatives to incarceration. Some judges experience moral dilemmas and guilt feelings during this process. In contrast, judges who highlight pragmatic factors (e.g., public perceptions) are more receptive to statutory restrictions.

Good Data, Good Law

Real-time data is crucial in delivering actionable information, yet sparse in the criminal justice space. Often, practitioners and policy makers (“System Actors”), are forced to rely on information that is missing, incorrect, and/or outdated. Recidiviz, a nonpartisan tech non-profit, enables System Actors to make data-driven decisions as part of their regular workflows. This article describes Recidiviz’s work modeling the projected influence of eliminating mandatory minimums in Virginia, including state costs avoided, impact on the prison population, and number of life-years individuals would regain by avoiding incarceration. Recidiviz calculated that if Virginia eliminated mandatory minimums for drug sales offenses only, over the next five years, it could avoid a cumulative $11.6 million in incarceration costs, give 360 years of life back to people, and decrease the prison population’s racial disparity. If Virginia eliminated all mandatory minimums, as SB 5046 proposes, it could help the Commonwealth avoid $80.2 million in costs and give back 2,496 years of life over five years. In addition to policy impact modeling, Recidiviz’s core work is in partnering with state corrections and supervision departments to provide real-time feedback and data visualization tools.

Prosecutor Mercy

The tailwinds might be behind criminal justice reform, but American mercy power remains locked in a sputtering clemency model. Centralized leadership should be braver or the centralized institutions should be streamlined, the arguments go—but what if the more basic mercy problem is centralization itself? In this essay, I explore that question. In so doing, I defend the normative premise that post-conviction mercy is justified, and I address the questions of institutional design and political economy that follow. I ultimately encourage jurisdictions to layer decentralized mercy powers on top of their clemency mechanisms, and for the newer authority to be vested in local prosecutors. I present less a single proposal than a collection of principles for mercy decentralization. Governors and presidents simply cannot deliver the punishment remissions appropriate for an American prison population bloated by a half-century love affair with over-criminalization, mandatory minimums, and recidivism enhancements.