Economic links and the wealth effects of layoff announcements along the supply chain

PurposeThis paper investigates the effects of layoff announcement by customers on the valuation and operating performance of their supply chain partners.Design/methodology/approachThe authors collect corporate layoff announcements from 8-K filings submitted by US publicly-traded firms from 2004 to 2017. Using event study methodology, they examine the information externality of corporate layoffs on announcing firms' suppliers.FindingsResults show that suppliers, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their major customers' layoff announcements. The negative price effect is exacerbated when industry rivals of layoff-announcing customers also suffer from negative intra-industry contagion effects. Additionally, supply chain spillover effects are asymmetric, with only “bad news” layoff announcements causing significant value implications for suppliers, but not “good news” announcements. Supplier firms also reduce their investments in and sales dependence on layoff-announcing customers in subsequent years.Practical implicationsThis study shows that layoff decisions, often aimed at improving firms' efficiency and effectiveness, create uncertainty for the suppliers' operation and cause negative value implications on firms' upstream partners. Findings should be useful to corporate decision-makers in making layoff decisions.Originality/valueThis paper is one of the first to address the value implications of corporate layoffs on announcing firms' suppliers. It provides a more comprehensive picture of the economy-wide impact of achieving efficiency through employee layoffs.

Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration where both information and payoff externalities exist and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that, even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first player exploration on the optimality of the second player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared with a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also and especially so, for public goods. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

Fighting Crises with Secrecy

How does central bank lending during a crisis restore confidence? Emergency lending facilities that are opaque (in that names of borrowers are kept secret) raise the perceived average quality of bank assets in the economy, creating an information externality that prevents runs. Stigma (the cost of a bank’s participation at the lending facility becoming public) is desirable to implement opacity as an equilibrium outcome, as no bank wants to reveal its participation status. The central bank’s key policy instrument for limiting the use of lending facilities while maintaining secrecy is the haircut applied to bank assets used as collateral. (JEL D83, E52, E58, E63, G01, G21)

ESTATE TAXATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL WITH INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES

This paper investigates the effects of estate taxation when firms cannot directly observe worker skill levels. Imperfect labor market signaling gives rise to an information externality that causes workers to free-ride off of others’ human capital acquisition. Inherited wealth exacerbates the information externality because risk averse workers with larger inheritances exert less effort to acquire skills. By reducing these inheritances, an estate tax induces greater skill acquisition effort and increases the number of skilled workers. In a quantitative model with employer learning and capital accumulation, the optimal estate tax is significantly above zero, increases wages and output, and benefits a large majority of households.

Uncertainty Traps*

We develop a theory of endogenous uncertainty and business cycles in which short-lived shocks can generate long-lasting recessions. In the model, higher uncertainty about fundamentals discourages investment. Since agents learn from the actions of others, information flows slowly in times of low activity and uncertainty remains high, further discouraging investment. The economy displays uncertainty traps: self-reinforcing episodes of high uncertainty and low activity. Although the economy recovers quickly after small shocks, large temporary shocks may have long-lasting effects on the level of activity. The economy is subject to an information externality but uncertainty traps may remain in the efficient allocation. Embedding the mechanism in a standard business cycle framework, we find that endogenous uncertainty increases the persistence of large recessions and improves the performance of the model in accounting for the Great Recession.

The Role of Information in Innovation and Competition

Innovation is typically a trial-and-error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead-end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner.