scholarly journals Establishing the Unconstitutionality of Menstrual Exclusion Practices in India

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 198-207
Author(s):  
Divya Srinivasan ◽  
Bharti Kannan

Socio-cultural norms, stigmas, and taboos associated with menstruation in India take a number of different forms, often resulting in severe restrictions on menstruators, which are described in Part II, below. In fact, a 2016 study found that only one in eight adolescent girls in India faced no restrictions at all during menstruation. The constitutionality of menstrual exclusion practices has most famously been challenged in the Sabarimala case, where the Indian Supreme Court in a 4:1 majority found that the law restricting entry of women of menstruating age into the Sabarimala temple violated women’s constitutional rights to religion and equality. In Part III, analyzing the judgment in Sabarimala, this Article will explore the potential of applying the verdict in Sabarimala to raise constitutional challenges to other forms of menstrual exclusion practices in the country.

Author(s):  
Neha Jain

This chapter argues that international law has served as a useful tool for the Indian Supreme Court in fulfilling aims that have little to do with the court’s purported status as an organ of the international community. Rather, the Supreme Court has appropriated international legal norms to pursue primarily domestic goals. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II gives an overview of the status of international law in the Indian constitutional scheme. Section III analyzes the creative uses of international law by the Indian Supreme Court to fill in and add to the content of constitutional rights and guarantees, enabling its encroachment into domains that are normally the prerogative of the legislature and the executive. Section IV puts forward a possible explanation for this appropriation of international legal norms and suggests that international law has performed a legitimizing function in the Supreme Court’s articulation of its vision of the state.


Author(s):  
Maitra Neelanjan

This chapter examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the related ‘Sovereign Functions’ doctrine in India. It begins with an overview of the text of Article 300 of the Indian Constitution and proceeds with a brief survey of the case law on sovereign immunity that preceded the adoption of the Constitution. It then revisits some early attempts to revise the law on sovereign immunity in the post-Independence period, before discussing the judicial treatment of sovereign immunity and how the Indian Supreme Court has dealt with the constraints imposed by its own precedents, along with the Court’s difficulties in providing a coherent account of sovereign immunity. In particular, it considers the Supreme Court’s attempt to bypass the constraints that it had placed upon itself through the evolution of new doctrines in fundamental rights cases.


Author(s):  
Barbara Zielińska-Rapacz

The doctrine of habeas corpus is that no one should be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land. The habeas corpus review is used as a form of inquiry issued to test whether a conviction or restraint is lawful. However, before having a chance to present their case before a federal forum, state prisoners have to fulfill the state’s gatekeeping requirements, such as the exhaustion of all available state remedies, requirements of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the absence of procedural default. Procedural default arises when the state court declines to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. To overcome the procedural default the petitioner has to satisfy the “cause-and-prejudice test.” In many cases the fulfillment of the “cause” element is often based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has to satisfy the test consisting of two prongs: establishing the deficient performance of counsel and demonstrating that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In federal proceedings the rule is to raise the claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in the collateral review. However, the right to a counsel does not extend to collateral attacks upon conviction, including a post-conviction appeal. Moreover, the counsel’s deficient performance does not constitute a basis for a procedural default reversal in the post-conviction claim. The abovementioned assertation may pose a question: what happens when the defendant is eligible to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in the collateral proceeding and the counsel representing the defendant in such a proceeding does not raise the claim?The Supreme Court resolved this matter in the decision from the Martinez v. Ryan case. The Court allowed for treating inefficient assistance of post-conviction counsel as a cause that could reverse procedural default. Taking into consideration the amount of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas corpus review, the Martinez v. Ryan case may influence a fair amount of individuals seeking their constitutional rights and give them their last chance to contest unfair conviction.Nieefektywna pomoc obrońcy jako przesłanka wniosku o habeas corpus w postępowaniu po skazaniu Wniosek o habeas corpus jest środkiem, który umożliwia osobie pozbawionej wolności zbadanie przez sąd legalności jej skazania. Przed skorzystaniem z tej możliwości skazany powinien wyczerpać wszelkie możliwe środki służące ponownemu zbadaniu legalności skazania, przysługujące mu na podstawie prawa stanowego. Ponadto wnioskodawca powinien uczynić zadość wszelkim stanowym przepisom proceduralnym. W wypadku niezadośćuczynienia temu obowiązkowi sąd stanowy nie rozpozna wniosku, chyba że wnioskodawca udowodni, iż nie mógł spełnić wymogów proceduralnych z powodów, na które nie miał wpływu. Wnioskodawcy w takiej sytuacji bardzo często powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy. Zasadą jest, iż na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu przed sądem federalnym można powołać się poza postępowaniem głównym obejmującym rozpoznanie sprawy w I i II instancji. Prawo do obrony zagwarantowane w szóstej poprawce do Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych nie rozciąga się jednak na postępowania poza postępowaniem głównym. Skazani nie mogą zatem powołać się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, aby odwrócić stan niezadośćuczynienia obowiązkom proceduralnym wynikającym z prawa stanowego. Taki stan rzeczy budził wiele wątpliwości. W wypadku gdy pełnomocnik wnioskodawcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym nie powoła się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, który reprezentował skazanego w postępowaniu w I lub II instancji, wnioskodawca nie będzie mógł później wnosić o habeas corpus na tejże podstawie, gdyż wymagania proceduralne prawa stanowego nie zostały spełnione.Do tego problemu odniósł się Sąd Najwyższy w orzeczeniu w sprawie Martinez v. Ryan. Sąd dopuścił możliwość powołania się przez wnioskodawcę na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym jako przesłankę niemożności zaspokojenia wymogów proceduralnych postępowania przed sądem stanowym. Biorąc pod uwagę, iż w ponad połowie postępowań związanych z wnioskiem o habeas corpus wnioskodawcy powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońców, orzeczenie to ma ogromny wpływ na doktrynę habeas corpus.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhmad Firdiansyah ◽  
Wachid Hasyim ◽  
Yonathan Agung Pahlevi

ABSTRACT In accordance with the mandate of Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution, all tax stipulations must be based on the law. To carry out the mandate in accordance with Article 17 of the Customs Law Number 17 of 2006, the Director General of Customs and Excise is given the attributive authority to issue reassignment letter on Customs Tariff and / or Value for the calculation of import duty within two years starting from the date of customs notification carried out through a mechanism of audit or re-research. To examine the application of these legal norms, there are currently Supreme Court (MA) Judgment (PK) decisions that accept PK applications from PK applicants and question the legality of issuing SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. This study uses explosive qualitative analysis to analyze the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. The results of this study indicate that the Supreme Court is of the view that the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC is a legal defect, while DGCE considers the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC according to the provisions.Key words: official decision, reassignment letter, DCGE  ABSTRAKSesuai amanah Pasal 23A Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Segala penetapan pajak harus berdasar undang-undang. Untuk menjalankan amanah tersebut sesuai Pasal 17 Undang-Undang Kepabeanan Nomor 17 Tahun 2006 Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai (Dirjen BC) diberikan kewenangan atributif untuk menerbitkan Surat Penetapan Kembali Tarif dan/atau Nilai Pabean (SPKTNP) guna penghitungan bea masuk dalam jangka waktu dua tahun terhitung sejak tanggal pemberitahuan pabean yang dilakukan melalui mekanisme audit atau penelitian ulang. Untuk meneliti penerapan norma hukum tersebut dewasa ini terdapat putusan Peninjauan Kembali (PK) Mahkamah Agung (MA) yang menerima permohonan PK dari pemohon PK dan mempermasalahkan legalitas penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Penelitian ini mengunakan analisis kualitatif eksplotarif untuk menganalisis penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa MA berpandangan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC adalah cacat hukum, sedangkan DJBC beranggapan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC telah sesuai ketentuan.Kata Kunci: penetapan pejabat, SPKTNP, Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


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