Being Sceptical about Kripkean A Posteriori Necessities and Natural Kinds

The article discusses Saul Kripke’s influential theories of a posteriori necessary truths and natural kinds. With respect to the statements of identity involving proper names, it is argued that although their truth is a posteriori and necessary in the specific sense of counterfactual invariance, this is of no significance for substantial philosophical issues beyond the philosophy of language, because this counterfactual invariance is a trivial consequence of the use of proper names as rigid designators. The case is made that the expansion of the realm of necessary a posteriori truths to the statements of theoretical identity that involve “natural kind terms”, as well as the Kripkean essentialist theory of natural kinds, have no weighty argumentative support and fit badly both with science and language practice. This sets the stage for the development of an appropriately sophisticated “descriptivist” account of meaning and reference that would be better suited for a widened range of Kripke-Putnam style thought experiments. The general outlines of such a descriptivist account are provided.

Living beings as autopoietic bodies

In the target article, it was claimed that the enactive extended interpretation of the autopoietic theory (AT) of living beings is incorrect, and an embodied reformulation of AT (EAT) was put forward to remedy and prevent such an interpretation. In this general reply, I want to clarify the motivation, reach, philosophical commitments, and theoretical status of EAT. I do this, mainly, by explicating the notions of body and autopoiesis, and by reconstructing EAT, not as a conceptual definition of life but as a theoretical identity statement of living beings as a natural kind.

Explanation and Individual Essence

In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered.

Reconceptualizing Play: Aesthetic Self-Definitions

This article aims to trouble the identity of children's dramatic play(ing). It contains two interweaving threads of discourse. In one thread lies a discussion of how children can trouble and extend their own identities through the aesthetic form-languages and conventions they employ and deploy in their dramatic playing/pretend playing. Whereas adults exchange thoughts verbally, children enter the play-arena and converse and reflect with, and in, dramatic form-languages. In dramatic form, through taking the perspective of, and momentarily becoming, The Other, the children problematize and construct temporary identities. In each dramatic enactment they are in a reflective process of becoming. In the second thread of discourse, the article troubles the theoretical identity of dramatic playing — as it is perceived in the dominant play theory of sociology, which defines playing as reproduction. This issue is addressed through the aesthetic concept of mimesis, by which playing is defined as critical transformation. In the interpretative work the author shows how, in the privacy of the children's play-culture, they have the cultural occasion, space, and liberty to take control: to question, to speak for themselves, to represent, transform and define themselves. The players can experiment with standpoints, redefine their identities and, thereby, take back their power of self-definition. Cultural hegemony can be turned on its head.