The Polarization Dynamic

The challenge of sustaining democracy is complicated by the fact that political engagement exposes citizens to a cognitive and social dynamical force known as belief polarization that leads us to over-ascribe malicious motives, irrational ideas, and extreme commitments to those who we perceive to be political opponents. As we politically interact with our fellow partisans, we come to see those who do not share our political identity as untrustworthy, incompetent, and threatening. This gives rise to the democrat’s dilemma. However, belief polarization also infects our alliances, turning groups of like-minded people into increasingly homogeneous and conformist units that ultimately are internally hierarchical and unstable. The reason we have to sustain democracy with our foes is that unless we do so, we will not be able to sustain democracy among our allies.

How Can We Sustain Democracy?

In order to sustain democracy, we must develop strategies for managing belief polarization within ourselves and our coalitions. This chapter spells out a two-stage approach. First, citizens must establish channels for subjecting their ideas to reasonable criticism; second, citizens need to occasionally create distance between themselves and the fray of partisan politics.

Group-Managed Real Options

We study a standard real-option problem in which sequential decisions are made through voting by a group of members with heterogeneous beliefs. We show that, when facing both investment and abandonment timing decisions, the group behavior cannot be replicated by that of a representative “median” member. As a result, members’ disagreement generates inertia—the group delays investment relative to a single-agent case—and underinvestment—the group rejects projects that are supported by a majority of members, acting in autarky. These coordination frictions hold in groups of any size, for general voting protocols, and are exacerbated by belief polarization.

More Accurate, But No Less Polarized: Comparing the Factual Beliefs of Government Officials and the Public

Studies of the American public demonstrate that partisans often diverge not only on questions of opinion but also on matters of fact. However, little is known about partisan divergence in factual beliefs among the government officials who make real policy decisions, or how it compares to belief polarization among the public. This letter describes the first systematic comparison of factual belief polarization between the public and government officials, which we conducted using a paired survey approach. The results indicate that political elites are consistently more accurately informed than the public across a wide range of politically contentious facts. However, this increase in accuracy does not translate into reduced factual belief polarization. These findings demonstrate that a more informed political elite does not necessarily mitigate partisan factual disagreement in policy making.

Belief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit

Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.

Can resources save rationality? “Anti-Bayesian” updating in cognition and perception

Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena – belief polarization and the size-weight illusion – that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?