The Metaphysics of the Material World

This book traces a particular development of the metaphysics of the material world in early modern thought. The route it follows derives from a critique of Spinoza in the work of Pierre Bayle. Bayle charged in particular that Spinoza’s monistic conception of the material world founders on the account of extension and its “modes” and parts that he inherited from Descartes, and that Descartes in turn inherited from late scholasticism, and ultimately from Aristotle. After an initial discussion of Bayle’s critique of Spinoza and its relation to Aristotle’s distinction between substance and accident, this study starts with the original re-conceptualization of Aristotle’s metaphysics of the material world that we find in the work of the early modern scholastic Suárez. What receives particular attention is Suárez’s introduction of the “modal distinction” and his distinctive account of the Aristotelian accident of “continuous quantity.” This examination of Suárez is followed by a treatment of the connections of his particular version of the scholastic conception of the material world to the very different conception that Descartes offered. Especially important is Descartes’s view of the relation of extended substance both to its modes and to the parts that compose it. Finally, there is a consideration of what these developments in Suárez and Descartes have to teach us about Spinoza’s monistic conception of the material world. Of special concern here is to draw on this historical narrative to provide a re-assessment of Bayle’s critique of Spinoza.

Metaphysics and Material Modes

This chapter concerns the metaphysical basis for Suárez’s account of the material world. It begins with his “analogical” metaphysics, which constitutes a distinctive contribution to the medieval scholastic debate over the applicability of the notion of “being” to God and creatures. Then there is a consideration of Suárez’s introduction into the scholastic theory of distinctions of a modal distinction intermediate between the real and rational distinctions. This new intermediate distinction yields the first clear instance of the early modern notion of a mode. The chapter ends with an examination of the two material modes that are most important for Suárez, namely, the substantial mode of union, which serves to unite substantial form and prime matter, and the accidental mode of inherence, which accounts for the connection between a material substance and its “real accidents.”

Internalism and Prudential Value

Existence internalism claims that facts about human psychological responsiveness constrain the metaphysics of value in particular ways. Chapter 5 examines whether some form of existence internalism holds for prudential value (as opposed to moral or aesthetic value). It emphasizes the importance of a modal distinction that has been traditionally overlooked. Some facts about personal good are facts about realized good. For example, right now it may be true that X is good for me. Other facts about goodness are facts about what would be good for me in certain possible futures. These are facts about merely possible good. Philosophers should be internalists about realized good. The chapter defends a qualified version of the idea that a necessary constraint on something’s being good for a person at a time is that the thing in question elicits some kind of positive psychological response from the person at that time. However, philosophers should be motivational externalists about merely possible good. Facts about the superior future goodness of an option may ground reasons now to choose it. But we should not expect individuals to always recognize such facts, and so there is no reason to think such facts are always motivating.

The First Cut—The Intrinsic Modes of Being

Chapter 4 argues for the intrinsic modes of being (e.g., infinite/finite, necessary/contingent) as ultimate differences in Scotus’s expanded sense of the term. The first section begins with an account of what Scotus means by an intrinsic mode and the modal distinction. This is followed up in the second section with a discussion of the modes of being finite and infinite. Whereas Scotus identifies other modes, the chapter argues why these are his preferred terms. The third section links the modes of finite and infinite to what Scotus, following Augustine and others, calls “a transcendental magnitude.” The fourth section explains how Scotus understands the categories as finite transcendental magnitudes and infinitumas the transcendental magnitude of the divine essence. The chapter then establishes the connection between transcendental magnitudes and intensity and argues for a uniquely “non-additive” account of intensity (the fifth section). The chapter shows the diversity of differential degrees of being, which can nevertheless be measured on a scale of intensity reaching to, but never touching, the infinite degree.

Distinction Theory in Descartes' Philosophy

The aim of this article is to think the theory of distinctions in the philosophy of Descartes, and, from this theory, to make considerations to subjects related to Cartesian metaphysics. In this way, in the first instance, the article deals with the difference between the procedures of exclusion and abstraction, since it is a crucial difference to understand the real distinction as it is thought by Descartes. In the sequence the discussion is directed towards the real distinction, at which point, in addition to the definition and functioning of the real distinction, its conflict with the substantial union is raised. In a third, the article addresses the modal distinction and its relation with the philosophy of Francisco Suárez. Finally, it enters into the theme of the distinction of reason. At this point, the article seeks to clarify difficulties presents in the philosophy of Descartes and that concern the relations between distinction of reason, formal distinction, distinctio rationis ratiocinantis and distinctio rationis ratiocinatae.

Apokatastasis and apostolicity: a response to Oliver Crisp on the question of Barth's universalism

Oliver Crisp argues that Karl Barth is incoherent on the question of universal salvation. Making use of a modal distinction between contingent and necessary universalism, Crisp claims that Barth's theology leads to the view that all people must be saved, yet Barth denies this conclusion. Most defences of Barth reject the view that his theology logically requires the salvation of all people; they try to defend him by appealing, as Barth himself seems to do at times, to divine freedom. This article argues that, even though his theology does lead necessarily to the conclusion of universal salvation, it is still coherent for him to deny universalism on his own methodological grounds, since the necessity and the denial operate at different levels. Barth has other commitments in his theology than mere logical consistency. To support this claim, I argue that the necessity which belongs to God's reconciling work in Christ coincides with a double contingency: (a) the ‘objective’ contingency of Christ's particular history and (b) the ‘subjective’ contingency with which this reconciliation confronts particular human beings and calls them to participate in the apostolic mission of Jesus. In each case, necessity coincides paradoxically with a kind of contingency, such that, within Barth's theology, we can speak of what Kevin Hector calls ‘contingent necessity’ or what Eberhard Jüngel calls ‘eschatological necessity’. Most debates over universalism focus on the objective side. There the question is whether the necessity of Christ's universally effective work compromises divine freedom. But Barth's concern on this point is whether the necessity is ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’, that is, whether it is determined by God or the creature, and since God can indeed will the salvation of all, this poses no problem in principle for affirming universal salvation. Barth's central concern has to do with the issue of ‘subjective’ necessity. Barth denies that theology is ever a matter of describing what is objectively or generally the case regarding God and the world. On the contrary, he situates theology within the existential determination and subjective participation of the one called to bear witness to Jesus Christ. For this reason, he rejects all worldviews, including universalism. The rejection of universalism is the affirmation of apostolicity.