The Recognition of Human Rights: A Threefold Myth

The discussion of the recognition of human rights by law suffers from the acceptance of three myths: that recognition is provided for in human rights instruments, that there exist moral norms ready to be recognised by law and that recognition is what happens when a legal norm that corresponds to a moral precept is adopted. To counter the first myth, the article undertakes a close reading of the relevant passages of human rights instruments. To counter the second myth, the article observes that there exist few if any universally valid moral norms ready to be recognised by law but an abundance of other moral precepts. To counter the third myth, the article argues that what happens is rather the replication of the content of a moral precept in law. From all these, it follows that there cannot be any necessary connection between moral norms or other precepts and legal human rights. This distinctness of moral precepts and legal human rights, it is argued in conclusion, is apt to strengthen legal human rights protection: it diminishes the influence ‘traditional values’ might otherwise have on this protection.

A Doubter's Guide to Law and Natural Rights

The assertion that there are no independent moral values which transcend the view of an individual, or the society in which he or she lives, may cause consternation to many. Indeed it has been argued that it will tum the liberal western legal tradition on its head by removing the foundation for the rights on which that tradition is built. James Allan in this article suggests that such consternation is misplaced. While an objective moral reality is denied, he accepts the existence of an objective physical world. From this premise he reasons that certain courses of conduct will have certain consequences which, by human nature rather than moral precept, will be desirable or undesirable. It is therefore unlikely that the status quo need be changed to take account of the possibility of moral scepticism. The author proceeds to argue that if the fiction of moral realism were exposed it is likely that the position of tolerance widely adopted in the West would be able to be better defended. He concludes that the Western legal tradition, its commitment to tolerance and the existence of rule based rights would be preserved and enhanced by an acceptance of moral scepticism.

Longitudinal Form and the Human Conceptus

Human rights are not a privilege conferred by the government They are every human being's entitlement by virtue of his humanity. The right to life does not depend, and must not be declared to be contingent, on the pleasure of anyone else, not even a parent or sovereign … I have no new teaching for America. I seek only to recall you to faithfulness to what you once taught the world Your nation was founded on the proposition — very old as a moral precept, but startling and innovative as political insight — that human life is a gift of immeasurable worth, and that it deserves, always and everywhere, to be treated with the utmost dignity and respect — Mother Theresa of Calcutta (1994) 1