Estoppel in Russia: to articulation of the problem

Due to continuing interest of legal community to the problematic of preventing contradictory behavior or in the Anglo-American legal tradition – estoppel, the subject of this research is an attempt of determination of legal nature of the so-called norms of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation on estoppel. The selected topic is relevant due to the fact that there is no unanimity of opinions regarding the nature of estoppel; it is viewed as interdisciplinary principle, doctrine, institution of law, sanction for violation of the principle of good faith, one of the manifestations of the principle of good faith, legal mechanisms etc. An attempt is made to view estoppel from different perspectives: through the prism of the English promissory stopper, from the position of continental maxim “venire contra factum proprium", in relation with the principle of good faith. The conclusion is made that the so-called norms on estoppel in the Civil Code of the Russian Federation represent a special case of the doctrine of noncontradictory behavior, known to the continental legal order through the maxim “venire contra factum proprium", which is a manifestation of the principle of good faith. Based on this fact, it is inappropriate to designate the aforementioned norms as estoppel, since even in Anglo-American tradition, the variety of estoppels does not allow considering it a universal principle, and understanding of estoppel thereof does not correspond with its Russian interpretation. Moreover, being a part of Romano-Germanic legal family, there is no need for the Russian legal order to borrow foreign legal phenomena, especially when the evolution of similar legal constructs can be traced in the fold of continental system of law, which Russia belongs to.

The Doctrine of the Conflicting Behavior Prohibition

The paper is devoted to the study of the legal construction of the prohibition of conflicting behavior. The author conducted a comparative study of the legal structures of venire contra factum proprium and estoppel. It is concluded that the indicated legal phenomena differ by their legal nature, although they have a common goal — to protect the rights and interests of the weak party. The paper indicates that the prohibition of conflicting behavior should consider a rule aimed at protecting a bona fide party by refusing to satisfy claims (material aspect) and (or) refusing to satisfy a procedural motion (procedural aspect) if the actions of the party that filed the claim, are aimed at refuting their own pre-trial behavior (material aspect) and (or) behavior in the framework of the trial (procedural aspect). The author highlights elements of the venire contra factum proprium rule, which form the subject of proof when referring to this doctrine, in particular: 1) the contradiction of secondary behavior to the original behavior; 2) the presence of dishonesty in the actions or intentions of a person acting in contradiction; 3) causing or intention to cause damage to the opposite side.

Venire contra factum proprium nemini licet –– Changing fortunes of the maxim demanding the constancy in conduct

Key words: estoppel, legal principles, good faith, European legal tradition

Venire contra factum proprium: From a binding past to a binding future

Inadmissibility of controversial conduct (venire contra factum proprium) is a continental functional analog of common law estoppel. It is a special “pitfall” under the rubric for the application of the bona fide requirement when inadmissibility of conduct is derived from its controversial character in regard to previous conduct. The article exposes a lack of necessity in the prohibition under the regimes of early private law codifications of the Modern Age (France, Austria) which is why one may observe its prevalence primarily in Germany after the enactment of German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code). The author thinks of its prevalence as a result of a drastic change in understanding the legal relationship induced by the restoration of corporate thinking in a renewed form as opposed to individualistic thinking associated with Roman law and the first draft of Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. For the courts, the inadmissibility of controversial conduct became a convenient means to justify the restatement of rules formally binding for parties in cases where, as a result of the application of formal rules, the connection between the conduct of a party to a legal relationship and its negative outcome, which under said formal rules, totally fall into the other party’s burden. Due to this, the concept of a legal relationship, previously built as mere correlation of a subjective right to liability, is complicated by an element of burden — some of which would be imposed on the entitled party. This revealed the formal side of inadmissibility of controversial conduct, which made it possible to correct what shall be treated in terms of new thinking as a gap of regulation formed by individualistic thinking. In material terms, the inadmissibility of controversial conduct is limited in literature to cases when the previous conduct of a certain person has caused legitimate expectations from the counterparty and the current conduct contradicts these expectations. The author refutes this reduction since from the outset, the founding idea of the rule was to preserve the interrelation between conduct and adverse consequences lost in the formal application of the law. The contradiction of conduct, hence, shall be seen in using a formal legal position to prevent the adverse outcome of one’s own conduct. However, development of this court practice revealed another function of the rule, much more important in the author’s opinion, namely, the acceleration of civil communication governed by private law.

Impugnación de acuerdos sociales mediante mecanismos societarios en caso de incumplimiento de un pacto parasocial omnilateral “Venire contra factum proprium non valet”

Existe numerosa doctrina contradictoria en relación a la utilización de mecanismos societarios para la impugnación de acuerdos societarios en caso de incumplimiento de pactos parasociales.

O Percurso Teórico do Princípio da Boa-Fé e sua Recepção Jurisprudencial no Direito Civil Brasileiro

O presente trabalho tem por escopo demonstrar como o princípio da boa-fé é subtraído do formalismo no qual esteve mergulhado sob a égide do positivismo jurídico do século XIX, e torna-se objeto de criação jurisprudencial, mas sem se libertar completamente dos laços de uma racionalidade positivista. Restrito aos parâmetros do formalismo, mostrou-se impreciso demais para ser aplicado pelo modo de pensar silogístico, o que demandou esforços da metodologia jurídica diante da técnica legislativa das cláusulas gerais, standards e princípios jurídicos, com vistas a delimitar seu domínio de aplicação. Eis o que foi alcançado pelas cortes germânicas do Segundo Pós-guerra; a concretização da cláusula geral da boa-fé em figuras típicas, que restam inadmissíveis em seu exercício: exceptio doli generalis, venire contra factum proprium, Verwirkung, tu quoque, inalegabilidade de nulidades formais e o exercício desequilibrado de direitos. Delimitado o tema do presente trabalho à função de controle da boa-fé no exercício de prerrogativas individuais, seu percurso encontrou tradução em outros sistemas jurídicos, nos quais ainda predominava o vazio de seu conteúdo. Elegendo-se como espaço de tradução da boa-fé a jurisprudência brasileira, submetem-se seus resultados a uma leitura crítica, revelando a especificidade da tradição jurídico-europeia no direito pátrio. Por fim, indagam-se os limites de uma boa-fé “prêt-à-porter”, para a manutenção do positivismo jurídico.

Ch.7 Non-performance, s.1: Non-performance in general, Art.7.1.2

This commentary analyses Article 7.1.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning interference by the other party. Art 7.1.2 deals with the situation known as mora creditoris — the obligee's failure to perform its duty to co-operate in order to allow the performance of the other party. It also addresses the situation in which the obligor's failure to perform is not due to a lack of co-operation by the obligee, but to another event for which the obligee bears the risk. The obligee that is responsible for the other party's resulting failure to perform is estopped from invoking non-performance. Art 7.1.2 is thus a particular instance of the general principle of the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium. This commentary also discusses partial interference, legal consequences of failure to perform, and the burden of proof relating to interference.