Charles Darwin, sexual selection and the evolution of other-regarding ethics

Although many read Charles Darwin's Origin of Species as an endorsement, rather than merely a description, of individualism and competition, in Descent of Man (1871) Darwin intended to show that natural selection could account for the most noble aspects of human morality and conscience. He did so in response to Alfred Russel Wallace's 1869 statement to the contrary. In doing so, Darwin appealed to the natural selection of groups rather than individuals, and to the maternal, parental and filial instincts, as the origin of truly other-regarding moral sentiments. Further, the inheritance of acquired characters and sexual selection had important implications for Darwin's understanding of how other-regarding ethics might prevail in an evolutionary framework that seemed to reward self-interest. In a short addendum to this essay I highlight just three of a number of Darwin's contemporaries who were impressed by this aspect of his work: the science popularizer Arabella Buckley, the Scottish Presbyterian scholar Henry Drummond and the anarchist geographer and naturalist Peter Kropotkin. In closing, I point to an extensive network of others who framed their concerns about both the ‘labour question’ and the ‘woman question’ in evolutionary terms, as a fruitful area for future research in this direction.

Towards analysis of the heritability of acquired characters: Transmutation and preinduction in Daphnia.

A revised translation of Beitrag zur Analyse der Vererbung erworbener Eigenschaften: Transmutation und Präinduktion bei Daphniden, by Richard Woltereck. This revision corrects many errors in the first draft. Published originally in the Verhandlungen der Deutschen zoologischen Gesellschaft in 1911.In this paper, Woltereck presents some long-term culture experiments in which he attempts to induce heritable phenotypic changes (and thus implicitly genotypic changes) through unaccustomed environmental exposure. He does not explicitly select any particular phenotype from these cultures.He finds that it is possible to induce changes in the first generation (which he calls “induction”) and the second generation (“preinduction”) after environmental stimuli are withdrawn, but no further.He infers that these changes are due to effects on developing embryos for induction, and on germ cells within developing embryos for preinduction.However, he concludes that he has not found evidence for the inheritance of acquired characters, as both preinduction and induction appear to be part of the animal’s inherited reaction norm, and their effects are transient. He suggests a more inclusive definition of the reaction norm to accommodate this.To explain how this might proceed, he draws upon the relatively new sciences of enzymology and immunology. He suggests that the idea of catalysis might be a good way of thinking about how genes can affect the reactions he is interested in, in that genes might be like enzymes (this is approximately three decades before Beadle and Tatum). Next, he suggests that we might understand the catalytic mechanism of such genes with an analogy to the inhibitory effects of antibodies. In short, he presents a model for gene-regulatory control of development (this is approximately five decades before Jacob and Monod).

Lamarckian mechanisms as developmental bias and their Darwinian base – descriptive versus explanatory biology (full version)

The article points out the main obstacles in the discussion of Lamarckian mechanisms, resulting from overly persisted beliefs, habits and understatement. The aim of the article is not to show new biological observation, but to indicate the need to change methodology. ‘Lamarckian mechanisms’ are those that create ‘non-random’ changes (in the aspect of adaptation), and even ‘resulting from instruction’, and these changes become evolutionary. It is part of ‘developmental biases’. To avoid widespread prejudices a permanent stress is needed that such ‘Lamarckian mechanisms’ are an effect of Darwinian mechanisms but this stress is not enough visible. The term ‘Lamarckism’ has two meanings unreasonably connected. The correct meaning is, that adaptive evolutionary changes can be induced by environment and next they are inherited, but typically it is understood as irrational believing that evolutionary changes are adaptive without necessity of help of Darwinian mechanisms. In this case the terms ‘Lamarckian mechanisms’ and ‘Lamarckism’ are not coherent which leads to misunderstanding. Such irrational Lamarckism has small base in Lamarck’s view, it arisen from too shallow interpretation of Lamarck. In the theme ‘inheritance of acquired characters’ a few steps to evolutionary change is indicated, which typically are omitted in the description. Old such descriptions need rebuilding in a new coherent system of notions but to create such system a theory is necessary. The Lamarckian dimension of evolution protrudes beyond the basics of Modern Synthesis however necessity to change the name of the synthesis to Extended Evolutionary Synthesis is discretionary decision. It would be obligatory, when the Modern Synthesis will be treated as typical theory derived from specified assumptions when its assumptions are extended. The article points to the growing need to pay more attention to the precision of definition, specification of assumptions and abstract inference, as deficiencies in these areas are the main cause of misunderstanding and a brake on progress. Unfortunately, they are not appreciated in biology, and even ‘speculations’ are considered undesirable.