Breaking KASLR Using Memory Deduplication in Virtualized Environments

Recent operating systems (OSs) have adopted a defense mechanism called kernel page table isolation (KPTI) for protecting the kernel from all attacks that break the kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) using various side-channel analysis techniques. In this paper, we demonstrate that KASLR can still be broken, even with the latest OSs where KPTI is applied. In particular, we present a novel memory-sharing-based side-channel attack that breaks the KASLR on KPTI-enabled Linux virtual machines. The proposed attack leverages the memory deduplication feature on a hypervisor, which provides a timing channel for inferring secret information regarding the victim. By conducting experiments on KVM and VMware ESXi, we show that the proposed attack can obtain the kernel address within a short amount of time. We also present several countermeasures that can prevent such an attack.

Title Page & Table of Contents

DiGeSt 8(1) General Issue - Title Page & Table of Contents

Front Matter: Cover Page, Table of Contents, and a Letter from the Editors

After a 5 year hiatus since 2016, we are proud to present Volume 11 of the Vanderbilt Undergraduate Research Journal. Our mission was to showcase the brilliant work of Vanderbilt students from any discipline and we are thrilled to publish this volume after over a year and a half of work. Despite our infancy as an organization, we were grateful to receive 32 submitted manuscripts this year due to the tireless work from our Publicity committee. In this volume, we are pleased to present papers from the Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, Humanities, Political Sciences, and Education, with many papers combining methods of study from different fields.