The Roadmap of Chavism to Power. Elections and Propaganda During the First Phase of the Bolivarian Revolution (1999–2006)

<p>La investigación desarrollará un estudio sobre el proceso político ocurrido en Venezuela luego del triunfo electoral de Hugo Chávez Frías en 1998 y su segunda reelección llevada a cabo en 2006. La hipótesis de este trabajo considera que Venezuela transitó desde 1958 una fase acelerada de su transformación socioeconómica y política, que superó la capacidad de adecuación de la dirigencia de los partidos políticos para establecer nuevos escenarios de representatividad y participación del sistema democrático venezolano. Esta situación favoreció el tránsito hacia un régimen populista-autocrático instaurado a partir de 1999, bajo la denominación inicial de la Revolución Bolivariana. Uno de los aspectos resaltantes de la primera fase de la Revolución Bolivariana fue el auge del gasto público entre 2003 y 2005, orientado en su mayor parte a cubrir el costo de las misiones sociales, cuestión que desestimó la importancia de invertir en infraestructura y ampliar la capacidad de producción del país. Ello obligó al gobierno de Chávez a acelerar la construcción de obras de infraestructura pendientes desde hacía años, para disminuir las críticas de sus opositores políticos. La estrategia electoral en los últimos meses de la campaña electoral de 2006 se orientó a vincular la imagen de Chávez con obras públicas emblemáticas ya terminadas o medianamente concluidas. Los resultados de esta investigación arrojaron que la estrategia de vender la Revolución Bolivariana como un gobierno con hechos materiales permitió estimular en el imaginario colectivo la idea de la supuesta eficiencia de Chávez como gobernante y en consecuencia la conveniencia de apoyar su permanencia en el poder.</p>

The Energy Politics of Venezuela

Venezuela is essential for global energy politics because it has the largest oil reserves in the world. Historically the nation has been a significant producer, but from 2013 onward it became immersed in a deep crisis. This chapter discusses the transformation of Venezuela attributed to oil extraction, the complexities of the political configurations molded by rent distribution, and the changes in sociocultural features due to the permeation of oil rents. Venezuela’s dependence on oil has often been explained through the “resource curse thesis” due to its incapacity to assure the benefits of the commodity-led growth model and to invest in activities that foster long-term development. Political science scholarship, specifically, has been most concerned with the use of oil wealth to shape state and society and with the relationship between the state and the oil industry in Venezuela, especially its national oil company, PDVSA. These arguments account for a paradoxical mismatch between Venezuela’s promise as producer and its indebted and inefficient oil industry during Bolivarian Revolution, led first by Hugo Chávez and later by Nicolás Maduro.

Hugo Chávez dan Kebangkitan Populisme-Kiri Amerika Latin: Venezuela Era Hugo Chávez (1998-2006)

Hugo Chávez appeared and emerged in Venezuela under political-economic crisis. This article argues that his power struggle supported by the people because Chavez vision and mission are to favour the people inrerest, and he takes care about people. . Chave political project, as stated Ellner as non- revolutionary path of radical populism, expressed through various political program missions, namely to encourage social revolutionary program, but not in the political project of the revolution, at least during the Chávez powers throughout 1998-2006. However, Ellner mentioned that non- revolutionary path of radical populism can also lead to revolutionary-path, meaning that political poryek Chávez is still unfinished and still possible to reach a variety of changes, whether the "Bolivarian Revolution" will take the form of non-revolutionary transformation, or even revolutionary- path.

The Commune Is the Plan

Recent years have witnessed a renaissance of radical planning in both theory and practice, but often with a persistent disconnect between the two. This article sets out from Harney and Moten’s concept of fugitive planning, adjusting it to speak to the still-colonial reality of the global South, before turning to overlooked experiments taking place in Venezuela’s communes. I argue that while grassroots planning in Venezuela mirrors all of the inherent and deepening contradictions of the Bolivarian Revolution, the self-managed socialism of the communes represents the only alternative to the perversions of oil development and the economic, social, and political crisis racking Venezuela today.