Arendt’s Break with the Liberal Imaginary of Society

The first part of the article analyses the imaginary of the characteristics and form of (civil) society as developed in early modern liberal political philosophy, especially by John Locke and Thomas Paine. It uses different contemporary receptions of the key authors of this tradition, namely the liberal reception of John Keane, which emphasizes the theoretical distinction between civil society and the state, the materialist reception of Ellen Meiksins Wood, which contextualizes political ideas in the political struggles and class interests of the time, and the reception of Foucault, which focuses on the development of biopolitical governmentality. The article finds that the liberal tradition imagined (civil) society as a given and self-regulating sphere that does not require interference from the state. A socio-historical presupposition of this imaginary was the economic sovereignty of individuals, and it overlooked the relations of domination and exploitation. In its second part, the article presents Hannah Arendt’s critical concept of society. She did not conceptualize society as a given totality and in a spatial way, but used it as a qualifier of a specific, impoverished mode of being, in particular to analyse the situation and perspective of minorities.

Humanitarization of University and Social Engagement Mission

The paper focuses on substantiating the institutional significance of the humanitarian component of University education and demonstrating opportunities for its implementation through non-profit activities of the University community. Transition to the new technological order accentuates the relevance of new personal and communicative competencies formed on the basis of education in humanities. Humanitarization is a priority task, which is reflected in the University education practices in the United States and European countries. The idea of upbringing a humanitarianly educated and humanitarianly oriented personality is declared in the discourses of the world leading Universities’ missions, whose activities are aimed at achieving public good for the society and its sustainable development. Russian documents and discussions on higher education emphasize the importance of humanitarization, but in practice, the humanitarian component in Russian universities is clearly being underestimated. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that humanitarization means mainly the strengthening of the cognitive element of University programs – the expansion of humanitarian specialties and humanitarian courses, but socially oriented University practices are not taken into account. Meanwhile, humanitarization includes both the translation of humanitarian knowledge and values – the strategic goals of the development of society, the state, the region, and the activity-based approbation of the knowledge gained in extra-curricular practices.Humanitarization of higher education is considered in the article from the standpoint of social and philosophical analysis, within the ontological aspect as a mode of being of an institutionally organized human activity on knowledge production and translation, which has closely been expressed in creating University 3.0, as well as in the idea and discourse of the third mission of University. The third mission sufficiently strengthens its emphasis on the anthropological and social function – orientation of University activities towards the genesis of a creative personality and the increased good for society. The goal of achieving the good is explicitly present in those social practices that are aimed at participating in the life of society without direct commercial gain and is implemented outside the University. The article examines the main types of socio-humanitarian practices in universities in Western countries.

Reflective Surfaces: the Individual as the Key Social Relationship in New Zealand Society

<p>The variety of concerns and everyday practices found in the lives of members of Western societies has to some degree deterred their exploration by anthropologists. In this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that a commonality does indeed exist within and sustains this multiformity. However, it exists where we might least expect to find it: in a dialogue which takes place with reference to the physical person rather than, as in other societies, with reference to the relations between categories of people. This thesis posits that the individual is not merely a synonym for person, or human being, but a social mode of being which is characteristic of particular social formations, namely those of the industrialized West. By mode of being I refer to both human experience and the terms in which it is comprehended. The mode of being derives from two overlaid dialectics: the inner dialogue between what I have termed the active self and the sense of self, and the engagement between that dialogue and the stock of options available in any given social ambiance. The mode of being becomes individualistic (compared to those based on exchange, descent, patronage, hierarchy etc) when the inner dialogue refers back to itself, when it is stressed as the locus of reality. The sense of self can be seen as a reflective surface in which is caught the configuration of elements derived from the social options, a pattern which differs sufficiently from person to person for the active self to be affirmed as distinct amongst others, as 'individual'. In the body of this thesis, the constituents of this mode of being are articulated and explored through a spiralling sequence of portraits depicting nineteen individuals, their relationships, possessions, opinions, expectations and the concerns which colour their lives. Three prime styles of the individual mode emerge. The most common of these stresses complementarity, and so focuses on partnership in marriage, exemplified and made demanding (purposeful) by children and home ownership. Less common, though increasing in frequency, is the autonomous style, which focuses on the person as separate, on a capability which carries its owner through a range of situations in which its use refers solipsistically back to the person, demonstratrating to others, particularly peers, those like him or herself (more the former than the latter) his or her high worth. Finally there is the participant style, which in contrast to the other two is more open to options, more fluid; which if involved in family and house, or job, is unlikely to make of those the enclosures they form for the executors of the other two styles. This thesis attempts to refresh our understanding of both individuality and society; and to show that it is not possible to comprehend the former, even though we may sense its significance, unless we broaden our perception of the latter beyond something that is shared, stressing community and categorization, to encompass processes which may lack a shared flcus or ordering but which are nonetheless simultaneously common and transcendent.</p>

Reflective Surfaces: the Individual as the Key Social Relationship in New Zealand Society

<p>The variety of concerns and everyday practices found in the lives of members of Western societies has to some degree deterred their exploration by anthropologists. In this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that a commonality does indeed exist within and sustains this multiformity. However, it exists where we might least expect to find it: in a dialogue which takes place with reference to the physical person rather than, as in other societies, with reference to the relations between categories of people. This thesis posits that the individual is not merely a synonym for person, or human being, but a social mode of being which is characteristic of particular social formations, namely those of the industrialized West. By mode of being I refer to both human experience and the terms in which it is comprehended. The mode of being derives from two overlaid dialectics: the inner dialogue between what I have termed the active self and the sense of self, and the engagement between that dialogue and the stock of options available in any given social ambiance. The mode of being becomes individualistic (compared to those based on exchange, descent, patronage, hierarchy etc) when the inner dialogue refers back to itself, when it is stressed as the locus of reality. The sense of self can be seen as a reflective surface in which is caught the configuration of elements derived from the social options, a pattern which differs sufficiently from person to person for the active self to be affirmed as distinct amongst others, as 'individual'. In the body of this thesis, the constituents of this mode of being are articulated and explored through a spiralling sequence of portraits depicting nineteen individuals, their relationships, possessions, opinions, expectations and the concerns which colour their lives. Three prime styles of the individual mode emerge. The most common of these stresses complementarity, and so focuses on partnership in marriage, exemplified and made demanding (purposeful) by children and home ownership. Less common, though increasing in frequency, is the autonomous style, which focuses on the person as separate, on a capability which carries its owner through a range of situations in which its use refers solipsistically back to the person, demonstratrating to others, particularly peers, those like him or herself (more the former than the latter) his or her high worth. Finally there is the participant style, which in contrast to the other two is more open to options, more fluid; which if involved in family and house, or job, is unlikely to make of those the enclosures they form for the executors of the other two styles. This thesis attempts to refresh our understanding of both individuality and society; and to show that it is not possible to comprehend the former, even though we may sense its significance, unless we broaden our perception of the latter beyond something that is shared, stressing community and categorization, to encompass processes which may lack a shared flcus or ordering but which are nonetheless simultaneously common and transcendent.</p>

Transcultural Competence Model: An Inclusive Path for Communication and Interaction

The impact of transnational migration and globalization on human society, along with emerging multiple identities, calls for reconceptualization of the meaning of cultural competence and a shift toward transcultural competence—a mode of being and learning in which humans communicate and interact among cultures in a very diverse and dynamic environment. Embracing transculturalism perspective calls for integration of new concepts and approaches in communication and education that promote active participation, adaptation, and interaction. To this end, this essay examines the holistic model for developing transcultural competence that involves inquiry, framing, and positionality that challenge our taken-for-granted frames of references and expand our worldviews. The study also explores how educators and learners develop cognitive, emotional, and social qualities, engaging in dialog and critical reflection that informs our actions as the catalyst for positive social change and transformation. Implementing this holistic perspective toward transcultural education can create an inclusive environment for communicating, interacting, and learning without opposing cultural, national, and ethnic binaries.

Network Narratives in Global Cinema: The Shift from Community to Network and Their Narrative Logics

In the backdrop of global interconnection, such films as “Crash”, “Syriana”, and “Babel” drew attention to the six-degrees-of-separation “network narrative.” This type of distributed narrative with multiple access points or discrete threads has long evolved, perhaps since Griffith’s “Intolerance” and via modern masterpieces: Altman’s “Nashville” and “Shortcuts” weave many characters into a portrait of their social ground unmapped by themselves; Bunuel’s “Phantom of Liberty” shifts among characters only through the contingent movement of the camera. These two elements (multiple characters, a floating agent) intermingle now in the way that the protagonist takes the role of the very agent navigating among contingently networked characters in further decentralized directions: “Birdman” centers on the hero’s salvation but many other people around him form and cross small dramas; the protagonist in “Waking Life” shuffles through a dream meeting various people; “Holly Motors” stages a Parisian’s bizarre city odyssey, with the true agent turning out to be a car/cars; “Mysterious Object at Noon” experiments on the ‘exquisite corpse’ relay of a story through different people whom the director encounters while moving around... What does this non-linearity with different causal relations imply? How do mobile agents floating over decentralized events relate to global networks in general? This paper investigates today’s network narratives through an interdisciplinary approach to the notion of network as opposed to community even beyond film narratology. For instance, if the masculine formula of Lacan’s sexuation (all are submitted to the phallic function but for one exception) underlies community, its feminine formula (not all are submitted to the phallic function but there is no exception) works for networking. Community forms the totality of all and an exception that fuels the universal desire to make it utopian, but network has the infinity of drives to (dis)connections dismantling community, yet thereby leaving no exceptional outside. Community is a closed set of subjects who may be ‘abjected’ from it; network is an open whole of endless links along which the subject-abject shift constantly occurs in the mode of being ‘on/off’ rather than ‘in/out.’ In Deleuze’s terms, community works as a “tree-like” vertical system of hierarchical units in the historical trajectory to its perfection, whereas the network creates a “rhizomatic” horizontal movement of molecular forces in non-dialectic, non-linear directions. Foucauldian “discipline” is a key to subjectivation in the community, but it turns into Deleuzian “control” in the network that promotes flexible agency and continuous modulation without exit. As actor-network theorists argue, nothing precedes and exists outside ever-changing networks of relationship. The network narrative will thus be explored as a cinematic symptom of the radical shift from community to network that both society and subjectivity undergo with all the potentials and limitations in our global age.

Alan Hollinghurst and Monstrous Vegan Camp

Chapter 5 turns to the manifestation of the monstrous vegan trope in two works by the British novelist Alan Hollinghurst: The Swimming-Pool Library (1988) and The Sparsholt Affair (2017). In order to establish the reparative potential of Hollinghurst’s vegan monsters, this chapter establishes the concept of ‘vegan camp’. Vegan camp is defined as a political aesthetic that transforms the trauma of recognizing the exploitation of animals into witty commentary on anthropocentric attitudes. Vegan camp offers the possibility of enjoying that which one is expected to repudiate, a queer mode of being and desiring that hyperbolically performs its failure to stand outside of existing structures of pleasure. Hollinghurst’s novels are seen to offer the potential of embracing derogatory vegan stereotypes as a means of challenging normative scripts of desire. Reading Hollinghurst’s novels through the lens of vegan camp offers a mode of asserting vegan agency.

Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions

Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” (intentionale Inexistenz)—and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” (intentionale Beziehung) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” (tendere in) of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions (intentio prima and intentio secunda), which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions.