Complete reducibility of subgroups of reductive algebraic groups over non-perfect fields IV: An 𝐹4 example

Let 𝑘 be a non-perfect separably closed field. Let 𝐺 be a connected reductive algebraic group defined over 𝑘. We study rationality problems for Serre’s notion of complete reducibility of subgroups of 𝐺. In particular, we present the first example of a connected non-abelian 𝑘-subgroup 𝐻 of 𝐺 that is 𝐺-completely reducible but not 𝐺-completely reducible over 𝑘, and the first example of a connected non-abelian 𝑘-subgroup H ′ H^{\prime} of 𝐺 that is 𝐺-completely reducible over 𝑘 but not 𝐺-completely reducible. This is new: all previously known such examples are for finite (or non-connected) 𝐻 and H ′ H^{\prime} only.

Automorphism groups and invariant theory on ℙN

Let [Formula: see text] be a field and [Formula: see text] a morphism. There is a natural conjugation action on the space of such morphisms by elements of the projective linear group [Formula: see text]. The group of automorphisms, or stabilizer group, of a given [Formula: see text] for this action is known to be a finite group. In this paper, we apply methods of invariant theory to automorphism groups by addressing two mainly computational problems. First, given a finite subgroup of [Formula: see text], determine endomorphisms of [Formula: see text] with that group as a subgroup of its automorphism group. In particular, we show that every finite subgroup occurs infinitely often and discuss some associated rationality problems. Inversely, given an endomorphism, determine its automorphism group. In particular, we extend the Faber–Manes–Viray fixed-point algorithm for [Formula: see text] to endomorphisms of [Formula: see text]. A key component is an explicit bound on the size of the automorphism group depending on the degree of the endomorphism.

Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases

Organizations fail due to incentive problems (agents do not want to act in the organization's interests) and bounded rationality problems (agents do not have the necessary information to do so). This survey uses recent advances in organizational economics to illuminate organizational failures along these two dimensions. We combine reviews of the literature with simple models and case discussions. Specifically, we consider failures related to short-termism and the allocation of authority, both of which are instances of “multitasking problems”; communication failures in the presence of both soft and hard information due to incentive misalignments; resistance to change due to vested interests and rigid cultures; and failures related to the allocation of talent and miscommunication due to bounded rationality. We find that the organizational economics literature provides parsimonious explanations for a large range of economically significant failures. (JEL D21, D23, D82, D83, M10)