On the Study of a Single-Period Principal-Agent Model with Taxation

This paper investigates a single-period principal-agent model with moral hazard. In the model, we implement bonus tax for the agent and analyze the effect of loss aversion by comparing with the results by Dietl et al. (2013). The existence and uniqueness of the optimal contracting problem are proved. Through an example, concrete illustrations of how loss aversion affects the compensation package are given. It is shown that although the agent’s efforts reduce, the fixed salary and marginal bonus paid by principal are increasing with the tax rate if the agent’s risk aversion and shocks in the economy are small. When the effect of loss aversion is sufficiently large, the curve of fixed salary is nonmonotonic, and the complementarity between fixed salary and marginal bonus disappears.

MOTIVASI BONUS, PAJAK, DAN UTANG DALAM TINDAKAN MANAJEMEN LABA (STUDI PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA PERIODE 2013-2015)

<p><em>The objective of the empirical study is to examine and analyze the influence of Bonus Motivation, Tax Motivation, and Debt Motivation in Earning Management. The variables studied are bonus, tax, debt, firm size, and earning management.</em><em> </em><em>The sample of this study is the manufacture company that listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013 until 2015. </em><em>The sample used in this study were 165 samples. The classical assumption used is normality test, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity test. Hypothesis test used is the coefficient of determination (R ²), simultant test (F-test) and invidual test(t-test).</em><em> </em><em>The results of this study indicate that (1) Bonus Motivation has positive significant influence in earning management. (2) Tax Motivation has positive significant influence in earning management (3) Debt Motivation has positive significant influence in earning management.</em></p><p><em>Keywords: </em><em>E</em><em>arning </em><em>M</em><em>anagement, Bonus, Income Tax, Debt to Assets Ratio, Firm Size.</em></p>