scholarly journals Judicial diplomacy of the German Federal Constitutional Court: bilateral court meetings as a novel data source to assess transnational communication of constitutional courts

Author(s):  
Philipp Meyer

AbstractJudicial diplomacy describes the courts’ efforts to promote liberal democracy and protect their institutional authority. Bilateral court meetings are essential for judicial diplomacy, encompassing jurisprudential (e.g., discussion of case law) and aims of strategic (e.g., maximising influence). This study presents a novel approach to assess such meetings. It analyses the German Federal Constitutional Court meeting reports between 1998–2019, using content and semantic network analysis. The content analysis shows that court meetings focus on jurisprudential aspects; however, strategic considerations also play a role in discussions with interlocutors from emerging democracies. These findings are substantiated by the semantic network analysis, which discloses that recent case law, Europeanisation, and globalisation are the main issues discussed. Hence, this study presents an analysis of a novel data source. Further, it contributes to judicial politics research as transnational court meetings could be a missing link to understand legal citation networks.

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 869-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hartwig

On October 14, 2004 the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) delivered a judgment which gave rise to vivid reactions in the mass media and to a dispute between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the German Federal Constitutional Court. In interviews, members of the Strasbourg court spoke about their disappointment in the German Court's unwillingness to implement decisions of the ECtHR while members of the German court referred to the necessity to respect national particularities. Whereas, normally, the ECtHR and the constitutional courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe are fighting side by side for human rights and, therefore, consider themselves as natural allies, this time their decisions, which seem to be incompatible, led to a dispute which attracted as much public interest as a film or theatre premiere.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Sven Simon

This article aims to provide insight into the relationship between constitutional identity and ultra vires review in Germany. First, a brief introduction is provided on the issue of the relationship between EU law and national law, then the diverging grounds for validity are presented concerning the interpretation of the CJEU and of the German Federal Constitutional Court. After the detailed analysis of the German case law, limits of a national reservation are scrutinised. In the end, a conclusion is drawn up.


Author(s):  
Leonardo Álvarez Álvarez

Este trabajo se ha propuesto analizar la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán sobre al proceso de integración europeo. Las categorías de soberanía y democracia, los dos pilares en los que se ha apoyado tradicionalmente su argumentación, se han concebido como cualidades de un ordenamiento nacional. Por ello, la naturaleza, las funciones y límites de la UE se han definido por el Tribunal Constitucional Federal a partir de categorías de derecho interno. Este trabajo ha tratado de demostrar cómo desde la Sentencia sobre el Tratado de Lisboa (2009), se han parecido sentar las bases para definir los conceptos soberanía y democracia, a partir de la tradición constitucional común de los Estados miembros. En definitiva, de lo que modernas escuelas de pensamiento científico denominan un iuspublicum europaeum. Esta transformación metodológica se lleva cabo por el Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán retornando a la concepción material de democracia presente en su jurisprudencia de los años 50 y 60. Si esta sirvió entonces para construir una democracia militante ad intra frente a los enemigos de la democracia, es posible que pueda servir también ahora para la defensa militante ad extra de la democracia. El respeto de la identidad política alemana impuesta a la UE en la Sentencia Lisboa puede hablar a favor de ello.This paper analyzes the German Federal Constitutional Court case-law about the European integration process. Both concepts of sovereignty and democracy, base of its reasoning, have been constructed as related to a national legal system. Therefore, the nature, functions and limits of the EU has been determined by the BVerfG in relation to state categories. This paper tries to show how since Lisbon’s ruling (2009), the bases for a definition of sovereignty and democracy from the point of view of the common constitutional tradition of Member States may have been established. That’s to say, what modern Schools for Scientific Thought call iuspublicum europaeum. The German Federal Constitutional Court makes this methodological transformation returning to the material concept of democracy established during the 50’s and 60’s. If it was then used in order to construct a militant democracy ad intra against the enemies of democracy, it may be now used to the militant defense ad extra of democracy. The respect for German political identity imposed by Lisbon’s ruling supports this idea.


Author(s):  
Clara RAUCHEGGER

Abstract The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 2071-2075 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Recker

In its Aid Measures for Greece and Euro Rescue Package case, the German Federal Constitutional Court affirmed the Parliament's budget authority to provide financial aid measures to the European Monetary Union. The judgment conforms to the German Federal Constitutional Court's case law concerning the transfer of sovereign power to international organizations and reaffirms that German participation in international organizations is linked to constitutive pillars of the German Basic Law. One of these pillars is the Principle of Parliamentary Budget. This principle provides that any financial aid package has to be approved by the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag) before guarantees can be given to other states by the Federal Government. In its holding, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the aid measures for Greece and the euro rescue package were consistent with the Principle of Parliamentary Budget and German Basic Law.


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