ETHICS OF KANT AND THE HERESY OF HUMAN WORSHIP.

The article examines Kant's understanding of ethics and the origin of his categories of morality. Particular attention is paid to the category of disgust, which is a kind of exception in Kantian ethics, since it is in no way derived from reason and the transcendental unity of apperception. Here Kant refers to feelings, and in general to some kind of irrational categories. The irrational category of disgust is used by Kant in those places where he argues the prohibition of suicide and the prohibition of such acts, which he characterized as “crimina carnis contra naturam”. Kant calls the prohibition of suicide the first ethical prohibition on which all obligations to oneself are based. Hence, it can be assumed that the rational Kantian ethics stands on a rather irrational foundation, which is the category of disgust. The prohibition of suicide is a basic Christian prohibition, Augustine calls it the most serious sin, since repentance is physically impossible here. It can be assumed that Kant in this case proceeds from such a dogmatic premise. But Kant himself argues this prohibition differently, pointing out that disgust is a distinguishing feature of man from other animals, therefore, the prohibition of suicide is a sign of man's dominance over other animals. This is more reminiscent of not canonical Christianity, but the old heresy of human worship, forbidden in the 4th century, in which opponents often accuse Protestant theologians

Dzieła. Tom 7. Inedita

The volume shows the diversity and richness of intellectual potential, which Marek J. Siemek used in his original idea of “social transcendence”. The idea can be compared with the transcendence of the discourse socially “placed” by Habermas and with the post-metaphysical rationality models from McCarthy to Brandom. It allows to answer such questions as: what reason and rationality is needed for the process of modern socialization to take place, and if it possible today for the “givers” and the “takers” to approve the rules of self-government having the same autonomy and within the same law which is expressed by the Kantian “transcendental unity of apperception”.

Bilden als transzendentales Prinzip nach der Wissenschaftslehre

In my contribution i would like to consider a thesis of Reinhard Lauth, according to which Fichte’s Doctrine of Science must be properly characterized as theory of the Bilden (formation), as “Bildenslehre”. In his late Berlin lectures Fichte understands Wissen (knowledge), in its actuality, as “Bild” (image). Knowledge is image and identifies itself as an image. The image as such shows a reflective and relational structure. The image presents an essential self-reflexivity and does not exist in isolation, but is a relationship to something else which Fichte designates as being, life, light, one, God. The basic idea of Fichte is that we have access to reality (to being) only through the image and in it, within a transcendental unity of being and thinking that must be conceived not as a fact (Tatsache), but as an act (Tathandlung). The term and concept Bilden (formation) expresses well the dynamic and active nature characteristic of the image. i try to explain this on the basis of certain passages of the Doctrine of Science of 1804 (second exposition).

The Way into Transcendental Philosophy from the Argument in Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination

This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination. Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos, i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which ligh t emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhra wardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent, ’aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ-h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light gives us the world as “this-there”; and second, as self-evidentiality (ẓuhūru-hu, ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower. Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light. The correlation in the evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world, and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, the evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.