Entailments of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness Stance

The CBC model has a number of implications for evolutionary biology, the cognitive neurosciences, consciousness science, micro- and cell-biology, and philosophy, particularly the philosophy of mind. A section covers the hierarchical nature of evolutionary mechanisms emphasizing why basic, early evolved functions (like awareness) become fixed and stable and are present in all later-evolved species. Special sections cover other, related topics such as reductionism (where a pragmatic form is recommended), the need to avoid an uncomfortable mysterianism that has crept into philosophy, whether plants are also conscious (probably not but I’m willing to be persuaded otherwise), ethical considerations of universal sentience, and the possibility of altruism in bacteria. A cluster of specific problems that emerge from the CBC also are discussed, such as how multicellular species emerged, how the sentience of single-celled organisms morphed into the focal awareness of the collective.

Where We Get Serious: The Cellular Basis of Consciousness

First, the chapter examines the research methods used in the past to look for the evolutionary origins of other forms, functions, and behaviors—specifically vision, memory, and affect. We find that searching for the roots in primitive species has been standard operating procedure and wonder why there is a reluctance to do this with consciousness—noting that the category error is the culprit. The formal Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model is presented, followed by a look at the species under consideration—the prokaryotes and archaea, the simplest of unicellular organisms. An in-depth review of the remarkable lives of these creatures is presented examining the perhaps startling array of functions they carry out, including sensing, perceiving, learning, memory, decision-making, and communication. The lines of criticism that will certainly be used against the CBC are introduced and, as before, prophylactic arguments are presented.

Can Robots Be Conscious?

The long-standing philosophical argument generally known as “hardware independent functionalism” is presented. This position maintains that consciousness is at its heart computational and any artifact that carried out all the causal functions of a mind would become conscious. This position is critiqued and shown to be hopelessly flawed. There is a long discussion on the “other minds” problem (i.e., “How do we know whether another entity, organism, person is in fact conscious?”). Included is an equally long review of Tom Nagel’s famous question (“What’s it like to be a bat?”) applied to robots and this is followed up with a review of John Searle’s “Chinese Room”—a thought experiment, now over 35 years old, which lays bare the futility of the functionalist’s position. It is acknowledged that there is a firm, almost compelling tendency to endow artifacts like human-appearing robots with sentience, and the reasons for this are discussed. The chapter ends with a summary.

Bio-centric Views of the Origin of Consciousness: The Search for the Solution to the Hard Problem

Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How does the brain make the mind?” The other looks for the first appearance of true consciousness in phylogenesis. Both approaches are reviewed and found wanting. The reason is they all begin with human consciousness and use it as the basis for the explorations. This, it is argued, has lead to a “category error” where the H. sap. mind is treated as a distinct type and not as a token on the same existential continuum as other minds. It also reveals the existence of the “emergentist’s dilemma” or the difficulty of determining how consciousness could spring into existence when one cosmic moment before, it didn’t exist. The chapter ends by anticipating criticism of these arguments and of the CBC and providing prophylactic arguments.

Why Has a Cellular Basis of Consciousness-type Model Not Been Proposed Before?

We have a chat with my caterpillar who manages to communicate that not only is he/she conscious but all living species are. I review reasons why no one has put forward this CBC-type model before, the main one being that the theory seems just crazy to most people, and follow up with a defense of anthropomorphism which others see as a confounding factor. There is a segue on fish and whether they feel pain—at least in the same manner as we feel pain as part of an interpreted, unpleasant experience with strong motivational elements. The conclusion is that of course they do—and the group of philosophers and piscine experts who take the stance that they do not are critiqued. The chapter ends with a survey of others who are or might be comfortable with the CBC model, beginning with Darwin who certainly would have embraced it.