Leibniz on Human Finitude, Progress, and Eternal Recurrence: The Argument of the ‘Apokatastasis’ Essay Drafts and Related Texts

The ancient doctrine of the eternal return of the same embodies a thoroughgoing rejection of the hope that the future world will be better than the present. For this reason, it might seem surprising that Leibniz constructs an argument for a version of the doctrine. He concludes in one text that in the far distant future he himself ‘would be living in a city called Hannover located on the Leine river, occupied with the history of Brunswick, and writing letters to the same friends with the same meaning’. However, his argument shows not that the future will be absolutely identical to the present, but rather that any finite description of the present and future worlds would be identical. In this way, the argument leaves room for the promise of a different and better future—even if it is one that could not be recognized by us as such.

Kant, Wolff, and the Method of Philosophy

Both in his pre-critical writings and in his critical works, Kant criticizes the Wolffian tradition for its use of the mathematical method in philosophy. The chapter argues that the apparent unambiguousness of this opposition between Kant and Wolff notwithstanding, the problem of ascertaining the relationship between Kant’s and Wolff’s methods in philosophy cannot be dismissed so quickly. Only a close consideration of Kant’s different remarks on Wolff’s approach and a comparison of the methods that Wolff and Kant actually used in philosophy can allow us to determine when Kant’s criticisms are justified and where the differences in their methodological proposals for philosophy actually lie. We see that Kant’s account of philosophical method in fact has some elements in common with the Wolffian paradigm, even though there are also relevant differences.

Imitation and ‘Infinite’ Will

This chapter investigates Descartes’s conception of the imago Dei, that it is above all in virtue of the will that human beings bear the image and likeness of God. The chapter begins by illuminating his understanding of the doctrine—how he conceives of the relation between human beings and God. It is argued that Descartes is alluding not to Scholastic conceptions of analogy but instead to the Augustinian–Thomistic tradition on the nature of image. Turning to Descartes’s conception of the likeness between the human will and God’s will, the chapter argues that he thinks the likeness is that both are infinite in ‘extent’. This means that human will can ‘extend itself’ to things that can be the object of God’s will, notable because Descartes famously thinks that absolutely anything can be the object of God’s will. An explanation is offered for why this interpretation is not implausible, contrary to first appearances.

Leibniz’s Ontology of Force

Leibniz portrays the most fundamental entities in his mature ontology in at least three different ways: (a) mind-like, immaterial substances that perceive and strive, (b) hylomorphic compounds, (c) primitive and derivative forces. This chapter argues that the third characterization is more accurate than the other two. Thus, Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics is even more radical than it initially seems: his ontology is best understood not as a substance-mode ontology but as a force ontology. At the metaphysical ground floor, we do not find substances that possess force; instead, we just find forces. Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences. For instance, it requires us to reconsider the status of time in Leibniz’s system and to revise our understanding of appetitions (or appetites) and perceptions.

On Living Mirrors and Mites: Leibniz’s Encounter with Pascal on Infinity and Living Things Circa 1696

This chapter examines Leibniz’s comment on fragment 22 of Pascal’s Pensées in the Port-Royal Edition (currently Lafuma 199). Leibniz responds to Pascal’s employment of the infinitely large and infinitely small and to the way he uses infinity to describe living beings through the example of a mite (ciron). In contrast, Leibniz employs the image of a living mirror (miroir vivant). The chapter argues that, despite superficial similarities, Leibniz’s use of infinity to define living beings stands in stark contrast to Pascal’s use of infinity, in that it stresses unity and harmony rather than divisibility and disparity. Leibniz’s use of infinity through the notion of a living mirror suggests that each individual forms an integral part of a well-connected and harmonious system. Whereas Pascal uses infinity to highlight our alienation and incomprehension of the world, for Leibniz infinity serves as a mark of unity, connectedness, and belonging.

Descartes on the Ethical Reliability of the Passions: A Morean Reading

This chapter considers Descartes’s view on whether the passions are ethically reliable in the sense of informing us of the value of things with respect to the ethical ends of virtue and happiness. The answer to this question is unclear, first, because the passions could not inform us in this way unless they were contentful mental states, which has been a contested issue. Secondly, even if the passions are contentful, it is not clear that Descartes regarded their contents as ethically reliable. Descartes often claimed that the passions are only reliable guides to animalistic aims and bodily survival. The chapter draws on Henry More’s reading of Descartes to show that Descartes did regard the passions as ethically reliable, with some qualifications. The chapter also shows that Descartes was a likely influence on More’s boniform faculty and, by extension, on the tradition of moral sentimentalism.

Locke’s Succeeding Ideas

Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.

Spinoza on Turning the Other Cheek

Spinoza rejects ‘turning the other cheek’ where humans live in civic community, and denies that piety ever requires it under those circumstances. Yet he argues that Jeremiah and Jesus counsel it under the exceptional circumstances where civic community collapses, and one is exposed to oppression. Spinoza defends his view by appealing to the love command—one must love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. This chapter shows how turning the other cheek when one cannot count on others to do likewise can be rational on Spinoza’s terms and how he resolves the apparent tension of his claim that one must not turn the other cheek when one lives under the rule of civil law with his claims that hatred is always bad, and that anyone who ‘lives by the guidance of reason’ endeavors to ‘repay another’s hatred with love or nobility’.

Hobbes on the Authority of Scripture

To understand Hobbes’s handling of scripture we need to see it in the light of his philosophical account of the norms controlling public religious speech and practice. Hobbes holds that we ought rationally to venerate the first cause of all and that the proper way to do this is to publicly adopt the local culture’s religious practices, however arbitrary or conventional those practices might be. He therefore embraces his own culture’s Anglo-Protestant scriptural religion in a spirit of genuine piety and reverence. At the same time, Hobbes also regards this form of devotion as a conventional human artifact that, given the ear of the sovereign and the cooperation of the universities, he might hope to shape in favor of Hobbesian moral and political ideals. The proposed interpretation of Hobbes’s treatment of scriptural religion dissolves problems facing irreligious readings on the one hand, and more straightforwardly Christian readings on the other.