Introduction

Author(s):  
D. Justin Coates ◽  
Neal A. Tognazzini

In this brief introduction, the editors summarize the motivation for the coming together of these chapters—which is to celebrate the work and philosophical legacy of Gary Watson—as well as the content of each contribution. Michael McKenna builds on and systematizes several key elements of Watson’s views on agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf extends elements of Watson’s oeuvre, notably the relationship between the way agents are responsible for their actions and the kind of response licensed by those actions. Pamela Hieronymi goes on from Watson’s work to offer her own account of what blame’s about. R. Jay Wallace is also concerned with Watson’s overall conception of moral responsibility, understanding blame to be an incipient form of moral address. Michael Smith continues the theme, offering a possible theory of moral responsibility similarly grounded in the reactive emotions. T. M. Scanlon continues a debate that Scanlon and Watson have been having over the moral status of psychopaths. Jeanette Kennett argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness; and that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them so as to make them plausibly criminal. Antony Duff extends Watson’s work on moral responsibility to the domain of criminal responsibility. Gideon Yaffe seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. Gary Watson himself offers his current account of the distinction between the two faces of responsibility and thoughts on weakness of will and negligence. Finally, a 2016 interview of Watson by Sarah Buss is a wide-ranging and significant discussion of Gary’s personal history and philosophical development.

No one has written more insightfully on the promises and perils of human agency than Gary Watson, who has spent a career thinking about issues such as moral responsibility, blame, free will, weakness of will, addiction, and psychopathy. The chapters of this volume pay tribute to Watson’s work by taking up and extending themes from his pioneering essays. Themes covered include:: compatibilist views of freedom and moral responsibility, the distinction between attributability and accountability, the responsibility of psychopaths, the nature of blame and its relationship to morality, the relevance of addiction to responsibility, the continuing influence of P. F. Strawson’s work, the connection between criminal and moral responsibility, the philosophical development of Gary Watson and the ways Watson’s views have changed over time. Contributors include: Michael McKenna, Susan Wolf, Pamela Hieronymi, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, T. M. Scanlon, Jeanette Kennett, Antony Duff, Gideon Yaffe, Gary Watson, Sarah Buss, Neal Tognazzini, and D. Justin Coates.


Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


This chapter considers the relationship between intellectual difficulty and moral responsibility. It focuses on this question: if it is difficult for us to come to believe the truth about some matter, and we do not in fact come to believe it, so that we are ignorant of that matter, does that affect our responsibility if we then act from our ignorance? Answering this question requires getting clearer on both intellectual difficulty and moral responsibility for actions done from ignorance. This chapter takes up both tasks, distinguishing three different kinds of intellectual difficulty—skill-related difficulty in performing, effort-related difficulty in performing, and difficulty in trying—and two different families of views regarding moral responsibility: agential control views and agential revelation views. The chapter then considers the interaction between these different kinds of intellectual difficulty and these different views of moral responsibility, focusing particularly on the familiar case of the Ancient Slaveholder.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Özer ◽  
Jovana Žugić ◽  
Sonja Tomaš-Miskin

Abstract In this study, we investigate the relationship between current account deficits and growth in Montenegro by applying the bounds testing (ARDL) approach to co-integration for the period from the third quarter of 2011 to the last quarter of 2016. The bounds tests suggest that the variables of interest are bound together in the long run when growth is the dependent variable. The results also confirm a bidirectional long run and short run causal relationship between current account deficits and growth. The short run results mostly indicate a negative relationship between changes in the current account deficit GDP ratio and the GDP growth rate. This means that any increase of the value of independent variable (current account deficit GDP ratio) will result in decrease of the rate of GDP growth and vice versa. The long-run effect of the current account deficit to GDP ratio on GDP growth is positive. The constant (β0) is positive but also the (β1), meaning that with the increase of CAD GDP ratio of 1 measuring unit, the GDP growth rate would grow by 0,5459. This positive and tight correlation could be explained by overlapping structure of the constituents of CAD and the drivers of GDP growth (such as tourism, energy sector, agriculture etc.). The results offer new perspectives and insights for new policy aiming for sustainable economic growth of Montenegro.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. S588-S588
Author(s):  
M. Mezghani ◽  
F. Fekih-Romdhane ◽  
F. El Ghali ◽  
M. Zghal ◽  
G. Jmii ◽  
...  

IntroductionIncest may be defined as sexual relations between close blood relatives. Legally, incest and sexual aggression toward minors are classified as a criminal behaviour. Tunisia is among the countries from which incest cases are rarely reported.Objectives and methodThe aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the psychotic structure and incest, and to describe the individual, clinical, and criminal traits of the incestuous father through clinical observation.Case reportMr T.G is 46 years old. He is married and has six daughters. His wife appears to be passive, and largely dependent on her husband. Mr T.G has had incestuous relationships, initially, with his two eldest daughters. The acts were followed by the mother's complicit silence and the non-denunciation of the daughters. Two years later, he starts an incestuous behavior with his third daughter. Incest took place in the context of delusion. The patient was convinced that he is responsible of his daughters’ sexuality education. He develops an incoherent theory of purification with a tendency towards morbid rationalism. It is only after four years of insufferable paternal incestuous relationships that the third daughter filed a complaint to the police. A psychiatric expertise concluded that the accused is exempt from criminal responsibility.ConclusionIncest is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which makes its approach, comprehension, and treatment quite complex. For a psychotic patient incest is a means to deny alterity by crushing other. It also allows him to find, in this complete power, control over his annihilation anxiety.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.


2021 ◽  
pp. 292-358
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter considers the most commonly occurring ‘mental condition defences’, focusing on the pleas of insanity, intoxication and mistake. The common law historically made a distinction between justification and excuse, at least in relation to homicide. It is said that justification relates to the rightness of the act but to excuse as to the circumstances of the individual actor. The chapter examines the relationship between mental condition defences, insanity and unfitness to be tried, and explains the Law Commission’s most recent recommendations for reforming unfitness and other mental condition defences. It explores the test of insanity, disease of the mind (insanity) versus external factor (sane automatism), insane delusions and insanity, burden of proof, function of the jury, self-induced automatism, intoxication as a denial of criminal responsibility, voluntary and involuntary intoxication, dangerous or non-dangerous drugs in basic intent crime and intoxication induced with the intention of committing crime.


Author(s):  
Ted Nannicelli

In a discussion of three kinds of performing art—performance art, music, and theatre—this chapter explores three topics: (1) The performer’s moral responsibility to her- or himself. When this topic is broached in the criticism of an artwork, it is often because a performer has done something that raises the question of whether he or she should treat him- or herself in that way—often, but not always, in a way that involves bodily harm. (2) The ethical dimension of the relationship between performers. In cases of collaboration, the creation of such performances necessarily involves an interpersonal dynamic, which, in turn, has an essential ethical dimension. It also considers the additional complication of performances in which audience members contribute to the performance in a sufficiently robust way as to be regarded as co-performers or co-creators. (3) The ethical dimension established by the relationship between the performer(s) and the (non-interactive) audience, rather than performers and other performers.


Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows


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