Time

Chapter 6 reflects theoretically on the intellectual and emotional histories of Sanskrit logicians that run in parallel to each other as and when scholars express value for and argue on behalf of novelty through writing, reading, and debate. It argues for a certain type of novelty that is employed by Sanskrit logicians in their texts, namely, a “synchronic” novelty, in which the new and the old are coeval. Then, the chapter turns to examine how novelty arranges scholars into a specific and differentiated existence with each other. Finally, it explores the idea that novelty contains an emotional history that reveals scholars not only thinking but also feeling novelty.

Doubt

Chapter 1 draws a connection between critical inquiry and the feeling of trust among scholars. It argues that a new relationship between doubting and reasoning can be found in the early modern period of Sanskrit logic that allowed for new forms of critical inquiry to be employed by scholars. Specifically, the chapter recovers a new conception of doubt called “doubt from speech” (śābda-saṃśaya) in contrast to an older conception called “doubt in the mind” (mānasa-saṃśaya). Yet, when scholars accepted the arguments for this new conception of doubt, they displayed themselves to be not only intellectually competent but also emotionally competent with respect to “the new,” enabling a feeling of trust to emerge between scholars who accepted the new view on doubt and its role in critical inquiry.

Space

Chapter 5 recovers the contours of the manuscript economy in early modern India for texts in Sanskrit logic. It identifies the “reading community” as the primary unit of this economy. Then, it studies how these reading communities forge values and consumption priorities within themselves and across space; and stresses that the category of the court or polity is not useful in thinking through these issues. Instead, it argues that this space functioned and was sustained not by the court but on the basis of both intellectual and emotional relations between Sanskrit logicians and “the text” as these scholars responded to novelty in philosophical arguments. The arguments in this chapter are based on a survey of approximate 4,800 manuscripts listed in a number of manuscript surveys and catalogs.

Happiness

Chapter 3 argues that the conception of the self (ātman) that Sanskrit logicians attribute to humans corresponds to how they give emotional meaning to place. First, it examines their argument—that emotions are particular to humans and do not occur in divine beings—in relation to arguments in Bengali Vaishnavism, where emotion is understood to be that which allows one to connect to the divine. Second, it examines a number of temple inscriptions that illustrate how emotions are used by those who participate in Bengali Vaishnavism. Then, it contrasts these inscriptions with colophons from the texts of Sanskrit logicians that exhibit a different emotion connected to logic. The chapter offers a comparative study that showcases competing notions of space in seventeenth-century Bengal.

Conclusion: A Time of Novelty

The Conclusion explores how novelty functions as the primary element through which intellectual and emotional responses to nyāya philosophy are generated and how they define intellectual life in early modern India. As these responses ultimately collapse into each other, it argues that what emerges is an imaginative process that brings into being a new philosophical community. It draws on certain theories in Sanskrit hermeneutics and literary theory as well as offers concluding thoughts on how novelty is able to alter the direction of the history of philosophy.

Dying

Chapter 4 studies the connection between the emotion of dying and the cognitive positionality of Sanskrit logicians when they think philosophically about how the city of Banaras confers spiritual liberation upon death. It discusses the specific causal processes, according to Sanskrit logicians, through which spiritual liberation is conferred by dying in the city and the role of true knowledge (tattva-jñāna) in this process. After exploring how dying is defined by Sanskrit logicians, it concludes with larger reflections on how Banaras is produced as a place by nyāya philosophical writing.

Objectivity

Chapter 2 stresses the connection between scholarly identity and intimacy in dialogue as it takes place between scholars. To explore this connection, it approaches the concept of novelty in a skeptical manner by arguing that Sanskrit logicians could and did purposely misrepresent the history of their discipline with the purpose of making their views appear novel, even if they were not. A superb example of this pertains to the debate about the ontological status of a type of relation called the objectivity relation (viṣayatā), which serves to link our cognitions to the objects of the world. A major outcome of this debate was the construction of a philosophical community around putatively novel positions—a process that displays an intimacy between scholars who accept a specific version of nyāya disciplinary history.

Introduction

The Introduction sets out the aims of the book and introduces its main themes. It begins by defining certain terms used throughout the book—“logic,” “emotion,” “intellectual,” and nyāya—and situating the book’s argument in relation to prior studies on Sanskrit philosophy in early modern India (1500–1700 ce). It also addresses the rationale for using the short essay genre, the vāda, as the point of entry into main concerns of the book. Finally, it provides a sketch of each chapter, as well as notes on the meaning of ontological category (padārtha) and on the book’s translation principles.