Conclusion

Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability. While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.

Transitions

The fourth chapter discusses the American intelligence shift in focus from the German atomic bomb program to the atomic research effort of the Soviet Union. Alsos scientists were eventually convinced that the German atomic bomb program was far behind that of the United States, and would not be a factor in the Second World War. However, Alsos was kept in Europe to ensure that the Soviet Union did not gain access to German atomic resources. This meant capturing German scientists, occupying German research facilities and laboratories, and capturing German raw materials and industrial centers. In some cases, when it became apparent that Allied forces would not be able to reach certain areas before Soviet forces arrived, Groves utilized the conventional forces of the U.S. Army and the covert forces of the OSS to destroy the resource to ensure it could not be of benefit to the Soviets.