The Dispositional Model Advocated

This chapter puts forward arguments in support of the dispositional model, and defends it against possible objections. The chapter begins by highlighting the key advantages of this model over the alternatives discussed earlier in the book (Section 8.1). It is then argued that the law-abiding disposition at the centre of this model cannot be adequately substituted (at least not on a general basis) by methods of inducing law compliance through punishment or reward (Section 8.2), and by moral dispositions independent of the law (Section 8.3). Subsequent comments are intended to allay possible doubts about whether the dispositional model sufficiently accommodates the possibility of disobedient action in response to legal immorality (Section 8.4). Finally, the extent to which the dispositional model corresponds with the reality of common attitudes towards law is discussed by recourse to empirical studies on the causes of law compliance (Section 8.5).

The Functional Argument

This chapter discusses law’s capacity to fulfil its conduct-guiding function within different frameworks of practical reasoning. A functional argument of Raz is initially presented: according to this argument, authorities—including legal authorities—would not be able to fulfil their intended function if their directives operated as reasons for action that compete with opposing reasons in terms of their weight, rather than as pre-emptive reasons (Section 6.1). Several grounds for this argument are considered and found to be inadequate (Section 6.2). The spotlight is then directed onto another relevant consideration: law’s structural suitability to counteract several situational biases operative in contexts of individual and collective action (Sections 6.3.1–6.3.5). It is argued that law’s pivotal role in addressing practical problems linked with those biases strongly militate against the weighing model (Sections 6.3.6). Finally, the implications of those biases for the pre-emption thesis are discussed (Sections 6.3.7).

The Dispositional Model Expounded

In this chapter, an alternative understanding of law’s relationship with practical reasons is introduced, which is labelled the dispositional model. According to this model, the existence and operation of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes some reasons that are neither ordinary reasons for action nor pre-emptive ones, but rather reasons to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system’s requirements. Following an initial description of this model (Section 1), several aspects of the model are elucidated in further detail, including the sense in which notions such as ‘attitudes’ and ‘dispositions’ are used by the model (Section 7.2); the formation and components of the law-abiding attitude that features in the model (Section 7.3); and the key distinguishing traits that set this model apart from the pre-emption thesis and the weighing model (Section 7.4).

The Phenomenological Argument

This chapter focuses on phenomenological arguments about authority, that is, arguments about the way authority characteristically features in our experience. Following an explanation of the relevance of phenomenology, a phenomenological argument of Raz is presented (Section 5.1). Different phenomena highlighted by this argument are considered, such as the mixed feelings sometimes experienced when one complies with an authoritative requirement despite disagreeing with it (Section 5.2.1); and the sense of normative bindingness often involved in the recognition that someone has authority over us (Section 5.2.2). Another aspect of the relevant phenomenology is then highlighted and considered: the experience associated with occasions of principled disobedience to authority. The picture emerging from this analysis is a composite picture that partly corresponds with the pre-emption thesis and partly corresponds with the antithetical weighing model.

The Challenge and Possible Replies

This chapter forms the first step in a critical analysis of the pre-emption thesis which extends over Part I of the book. The chapter focuses on certain situations in which we ought to disobey a directive for morel reasons (Section 2.1). If these (or some of these) are cases where Razian authority is defeated by some of the reasons it is supposed to exclude, they will constitute counterexamples to the pre-emption thesis. Two ways in which proponents of the pre-emption thesis may seek to avert such a conclusion are singled out for consideration in later chapters: the first subsumes the relevant situations as cases of lack of authority (‘the no-authority reply’); the second locates them outside the scope of exclusionary force exercised by the authority’s directives (‘the scope-of-exclusion reply’). Further discussion confirms that these two alternatives exhaust the available routes of response to the challenge at hand (Sections 2.2–2.3).

Scope of Exclusion

The discussion in this chapter centres on what was entitled in Chapter 2 the scope-of-exclusion reply. The chapter considers various possible scope-demarcating criteria, which involve arguments about the type of reasons authorities have power to pronounce upon as well as tools of interpretation that can help determine their directives’ scope of application. It is argued that, in at least some of the relevant disobedience-warranting situations, the reasons that warrant disobedience fall within the scope of exclusion, or cannot be marked out of that scope without relying on demarcation criteria which are themselves inconsistent with the pre-emption thesis.

The Dispositional Model

This final chapter discusses further theoretical issues related to the dispositional model in an attempt to cast more light on the model and lend additional support to it. The chapter begins by considering how the dispositional model relates to a conception of rule-based decision-making, put forward by Frederick Schauer, which explains the normative force of rules in terms of a presumption (Section 9.1). The chapter subsequently discusses the dispositional model’s relationship with relevant themes in the philosophy of action and ethics, which include the distinction between state-given and object-given reasons (Section 9.2); the ‘guise of the good’ thesis (Section 9.3); and virtue ethics (Section 9.4). The chapter closes with general remarks on the observations made in the book (Section 9.5).

Lack of Authority

This chapter considers what was entitled in Chapter 2 the no-authority reply. The discussion revolves around prerequisites of legitimate authority that could ground this reply in a manner consistent with the pre-emption thesis’s core tenets. Section 3.1 considers the legitimacy prerequisites stated in Raz’s ‘service conception of authority’, and Section 3.2 focuses on jurisdictional and procedural limitations on authoritative power. It is found that these different prerequisites cannot rule out the possible occurrence of disobedience-warranting situations under a legitimate authority. Section 3.3 discusses the suggestion that authority is limited to the effect that its directives are not binding if clearly wrong. It is shown that Raz is disinclined to accept this suggestion, and that accepting it would collapse his pre-emption thesis (with the notion of exclusionary reasons at its heart) into a substantively different model.

Introduction

This chapter presents the book’s topic, i.e. law’s interaction with practical reasons, demarcates the scope of the book, and clarifies some key notions relevant to the inquiry. Specific issues commented on include, inter alia, the book’s working assumptions on the criteria of legal validity (Section 1.1.1); the relevance of arguments about authority (Section 1.1.2); and the type of reasons central to the inquiry (Section 1.2). Finally, the chapter sets out the two principal positions examined in Parts I and II: first, Raz’s position that when the law satisfies certain conditions that invest it with legitimate authority, it acquires pre-emptive force, namely it constitutes reasons for action that exclude and take the place of some other reasons; and, second, an antithetical position, the weighing model, which explains the relevant phenomenon in terms of reasons for action that compete with other reasons by means of their weight (Section 1.3).