Is Plantinga-Style Christian Philosophy Really Philosophy?

In this chapter John Schellenberg defends the proposal that the intellectual activity associated with Alvin Plantinga’s work on religion, a Reformed sort of Christian philosophy (RCP), isn’t properly regarded as being philosophy at all—not even philosophy of religion. Instead, Schellenberg argues that it is theology. He begins by clarifying how RCP should be understood. Then he presents and defends a condition he calls the Communal Condition, which says that to be doing philosophy one must aim not just to solve certain fundamental problems, or contribute thereto, but to do so together with like-minded others in a shared enterprise leading to informed consensus. Finally, Schellenberg defends the view that, although it satisfies very well a condition sufficient for something to count as theology, RCP cannot satisfy the Communal Condition.

Taking Plantinga Seriously

In this chapter, Merold Westphal suggests that Christian philosophers pay more attention to their other audience, the Church, that they reflect on ways in which their situation is similar to that of feminist philosophers, and that they seek to transcend not only the foundationalism and evidentialism of modernity, but also to go beyond its monological concept of reason to a dialogical concept. Finally, and at greater length, Westphal suggests that Christian philosophers abandon the widespread assumption that the coin of their realm is propositions, assuming too easily that we have already transcended Plato’s cave when we start our work and speak a language that is no natural language. The bearing of this issue on the realism/anti-realism issue and on the relation of metaphysics to both politics and spirituality is explored.

Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life

In this chapter, Kyla Ebels-Duggan considers how Christian philosophers should decide which questions are worth asking. She provides an interpretation and defense of Alvin Plantinga’s claim that Christian philosophers should strive for autonomy, and then argues that this rules out some ways of settling on our questions. Ebels-Duggan then suggests that the questions in which Christian philosophers should take an interest are those arising from or continuous with a distinctively Christian way of life. Along the way she argues that the power of the distinctive tools of philosophy is importantly limited: reasoning alone cannot settle either which questions we should ask or which commitments we should take on.

Beyond Two-Valued Logics

For this Jewish philosopher, the turn to Christian philosophy, stimulated by Alvin Plantinga and others, was a welcome event, challenging the hegemonic modern model of rationality. Twenty years later, Peter Ochs remains hopeful about the turn to Christian philosophy, but is also disappointed. He is hopeful because this turn has encouraged turns to other scripturally grounded traditions of rationality as well, including Jewish philosophy. He is also disappointed because the largest sub-society of Christian philosophers has tended to uphold the hegemony of the modern model of logic: practicing and promoting types of two-valued, propositional logic as the standard model of rationality even when applied to subjects toward which Christianity has privileged access. While his appreciation for the turn to Christian philosophy is stronger than his disappointments, he focuses here on the disappointments alone, so that, with limited space, he can address them more fully.

Discerning the Spirit

In this chapter, Neal DeRoo argues that the primary task of Christian philosophy is discerning the “spirit” of the age and not merely offering rational defenses of theism. It begins by articulating the notion of “spirit” (drawn from the later Husserl) that is at work in this chapter. Then it articulates a philosophical anthropology that makes clear how such “spirit” is pre-theoretically operative as a dynamic, religious force in all human action. Next, it argues that discerning, articulating, and clarifying the nature of this “spirit” as it functions in a particular culture or community is the task of Christian philosophy. It ends by showing how diagnosing these spirits of the age is not only an intellectual project, but enables the Christian philosopher to provide a concrete service to the broader Christian community.

On Divine Dedication

This is a chapter on the nature, value, and scope of what is involved in dedications, both among persons and, ultimately, in dedicating something (or someone) to God. The relevant concepts in the philosophy of dedication are developed: the intentionality involved, the importance of sincerity, the notion of a dedicatory good, and so on. In ideal cases, a dedication honors both the donor and recipient of the dedication, and enhances the value and meaning of the object (thing, event, activity, or even the life of a person) donated. The chapter concludes with exploring what is involved in the dedication of time to the God of Christianity.

The Strategies of Christian Philosophy

In this chapter, J. Aaron Simmons argues that philosophers who are Christians now find themselves in a situation where continuing to engage in Christian philosophy, in the technical sense as laid out by Plantinga, is likely to be a problematic strategy on three fronts. Philosophically, it is problematic because it can close down potential lines of inquiry that might profitably be pursued and, thereby, lead to a problematic professional insularity. Theologically, it is problematic because it can lead to theological triumphalism and arrogance that cut against the humility and invitation found in the example of Christ. And socially, it is problematic because it can foster extremism at the level of one’s justificatory appeals. Simmons concludes by suggesting that Merold Westphal offers an approach to Christian philosophy that is well suited to the contemporary situation.

Advice for Analytic Theologians

Extending the model of Alvin Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” in this chapter, Trent Dougherty offers his own “advice” to those working in the emerging field of analytic theology. Through a series of specific suggestions regarding the best practices of analytic theology, Dougherty describes some of the Christian’s community-specific projects that stand in need of attention, and then issues a call to Christians—of all stations of academic rank—to attend to these problems. Partly an exercise in “practical theology” itself, this chapter seeks to be sensitive to the real-world problems connected to how students of analytic theology find themselves situated.

Teaching Evil

In this chapter, Meghan Sullivan reflects on difficulties we face in teaching the problem of evil. She describes two approaches to the epistemology of theism—one which insists that answers to challenges be as neutral as possible and one which insists that we are rationally justified in appealing to particular faith commitments when answering challenges. After defending the latter approach from some objections, she argues that taking this approach seriously motivates a more confessional approach to teaching the problem of evil (and other, non-religious philosophical puzzles as well).

The Two-Fold Task of Christian Philosophy of Religion

Using Pierre Hadot’s idea of “philosophy as a way of life,” Bruce Ellis Benson argues that Christian philosophy of religion is ultimately about the practical task of living our lives. But he contends that this task is two-fold: it includes both theory and also practice. While analytic philosophy of religion (APR) tends to emphasize theory and continental philosophy of religion (CPR) tends to emphasize practice (admittedly, these generalizations are only true to a certain extent), APR and CPR are both part of a two-fold task. Throughout the chapter, Benson puts into question any hard distinction between theory and practice.