A New Defense for Self-Defense

Private defense, like self-defense, has been virtually undisputed both in the past and present and even taken for granted, and perhaps particularly for this reason, sufficient attention has not always been given to the rationale underlying private defense. As a result, the legal arrangements set for private defense in the different legal systems are deficient, inconsistent, and, at times, replete with internal contradictions. This article seeks to propose a sound rationale for the concept of private defense. It begins by attempting to clearly and precisely delineate the scope of the defense and weed out cases that are occasionally (and, I maintain, mistakenly) included in the framework of its scope by means of two general and imperative distinctions: between justification and excuse and between the definitive components of offenses and those of defenses. With regard to the first distinction, I consider the validity of its application and its possible implications for private defense. Since the validity of the second distinction is undisputed as an empirical fact (at least formally) in all modern penal codes, the question raised is whether there is a significant difference between the definition of offenses and the definition of defenses. The answer to this question is relevant to a number of issues, and of particular relevance to private defense are its implications for the application of the principle of legality and with regard to the mental element that should be required of the actor in such situations. Next I embark on a discussion of the various theories competing for predominance as elucidations of private defense. These theories and this discussion then serve as the background and foundation for the construction of the article's proposed rationale for private defense. The novelty of this rationale is in its integrative approach, melding a number of the proposed justifications for self-defense, rather than taking the traditional path of espousing one all-excluding rationale.

Benthamite Reflections on Codification of the General Principles of Criminal Liability: Towards the Panopticon

Chapter 2 of the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code codifies the general principles of criminal liability. All federal criminal offenses, whether or not they appear in the substantive chapters of the Code, are subject to its provisions. Chapter 2 is based on article 2 of the American Model Penal Code and the equivalent general part of the UK Draft Criminal Code. It is, however, a more completely articulated statement of the elements of liability than either of its predecessors. This paper examines the relationship between physical and fault elements in chapter 2. It takes a Benthamite view of its provisions. Though chapter 2 was conceived as a legislative restatement of common law principles of criminal justice it can be expected to play a more significant role as a manual of instructions for the expression of legislative intentions. Chapter 2 enables the legislature to reclaim from courts the authority to define the grounds of criminal liability. There remain, however, areas of uncertainty resulting from the mismatch between the articulate clarity of most chapter 2 provisions and others that envisage the exercise of unstructured judicial discretion. Two issues in particular are discussed: liability for ulterior intentions and the effect of error or ignorance of law on criminal responsibility. The paper proposes enactment of a defense of reasonable mistake of law as a supplement to chapter 2. It concludes with an expression of hope that Australian criminal law theory might be based on a more unified consideration of legisprudence and common law.