The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clemency

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel T. Morison
Author(s):  
Kristján Kristjánsson

Aristotelian virtue ethics has gained momentum within latter-day moral theorizing. Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life; after all, Aristotle says that emotions can have an intermediate and best condition proper to virtue. Yet nowhere does Aristotle provide a definitive list of virtuous emotions. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle does analyse a number of emotions. However, many emotions that one would have expected to see there fail to get a mention, and others are written off rather hastily as morally defective. Whereas most of what goes by the name of ‘Aristotelian’ virtue ethics nowadays is heavily reconstructed and updated Aristotelianism, such exercises in retrieval have not been systematically attempted with respect to his emotion theory. The aim of this book is to offer a revised ‘Aristotelian’ analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle either did not mention (such as awe, grief, and jealousy), relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (such as shame), made disparaging remarks about (such as gratitude) or rejected explicitly (such as pity, understood as pain at another person’s deserved bad fortune). It is argued that there are good ‘Aristotelian’ reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. The book begins with an overview of Aristotle’s ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and it ends with an account of Aristotelian emotion education.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder

I turn my attention to the theoretical or moral justification for the offence of misconduct in public office. I argue that the offence of misconduct in office is only tenuously connected to the ‘harm principle’ justification for criminalization. I suggest that the offence is better explained by what I call the ‘role’ theory of criminalization. I also consider the legitimate scope of the offence: the kinds of misconduct that it should, and should not, cover. In that regard, we will see that codes of conduct that govern officials—a vital written element to the UK’s constitution—play a role not merely in setting boundaries but also in minimizing rule of law uncertainty about the kind of misconduct that may be found to fall within the scope of the offence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-497
Author(s):  
Yann Bochsler

Abstract The present research deals with the policies directed at young adults on social assistance (YAS) without vocational training and the way implementers themselves as well as the YAS perceive policy implementation. In Switzerland, a currently on-going strategic shift in the policy field of welfare and youth policies has renewed emphasis on vocational education and training (VET) as a first and primary integration step. This policy shift has implications for the socio-political alignment of the cantonal administration. As a guideline, the renewed emphasis on “education first” dictates an approach that follows an economic and paternalistic logic. Building on collected data within cantonal administrations (Basel-City and Geneva) and encounters with YAS, this paper discusses the underlying narratives of these policies and their moral justification patterns.


Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marja K. Svanberg ◽  
Carl F. C. Svanberg

AbstractThis paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business (i.e., aspects of running a business), but not the end of business (i.e., profits).


1991 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald M. Green

The claim that “Everyone's doing it” is frequently offered as a reason for engaging in behavior that is widespread but less-than-ideal. This is particularly true in business, where competitors’ conduct often forces hard choices on managers. When is the claim “Everyone's doing it” a morally valid reason for following others’ lead? This discussion proposes and develops five prima facie conditions to identify when the existence of prevalent but otherwise undesirable behavior provides a moral justification for our engaging in such behavior ourselves. The balance of the discussion focuses on testing these conditions by applying them to a series of representative cases in business ethics.


Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  

The aim of this paper is to identify how the ethical-political foundation of human rights in John Rawls’s theory of justice makes use of a coherentist model of moral justification in which cognitivism, liberalism, pluralism, non-foundationalism, and mitigated intuititionism stand out, leading to a pragmatic model of foundation with public justification in The Law of Peoples (LP). The main idea is to think about the reasonableness of the universal defence of human rights as primary goods with the aspects foliows: its political nature, not metaphysical; its theoretical coherentist model, non-foundationalist; its pragmatic function and its public justification.


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