EISENHOWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ARMS CONTROL

2017 ◽  
pp. 327-349
Author(s):  
Philip Nash
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control

A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America

1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Control Mechanism ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Free Zone ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

Institutional Resilience, Deterrence and the Transition to Zero Nuclear Weapons

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 262-280
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Timely Manner ◽  
Shared Interest ◽  
Determining Factors ◽  
Institutional Cooperation ◽  
Factors Of Influence ◽  
Governing Institutions

The goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is directly related to the issues of international institutions and deterrence. Assuming that it would be possible, first, to move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons and then to zero nuclear weapons, governing institutions would have to be resilient enough to respond in a timely manner and to uphold the bargain. But what factors determine and influence institutional resilience? And what would be the likely role of deterrence? This article first assesses what the general ir narratives tell us about determining factors. It then examines two empirical cases from the realm of arms control institutions (the cfe and the npt treaties) and asks why these agreements are not as effective as intended. The next section discusses three additional factors of influence and identifies a shared interest in overcoming the deterrence principle as a key variable for institutional cooperation and as a factor that continues to influence resilience and effectiveness. The last section presents the conclusions.

scholarly journals Contests of legitimacy and value: the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the logic of prohibition

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1075-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Considine
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Complex Structures ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Existing Structures ◽  
Stated Goal

Abstract The recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has caused much debate and controversy in global nuclear politics. Given that the stated goal of the TPNW supporters (states and NGOs alike) is to embed the treaty in the structures of nuclear governance and to strengthen its normative power, how likely is the TPNW to achieve these objectives? The article argues that the unique structures of legitimacy and value within which nuclear weapons are enmeshed place particular complications on the normative force of the TPNW as compared to previous humanitarian arms control initiatives, which has implications for the way in which the TPNW can function to consolidate a prohibitionary norm on nuclear weapons possession. The article uses the framing of legitimacy to analyse the complex structures within which the TPNW was adopted and within which it will enter into force, particularly focusing on the TPNW's relationship to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The article concludes that consolidation may require a further challenge to the existing structures of nuclear order than state actors have, so far, been willing to make. This work is based on first-hand observations from the TPNW negotiations and interviews with civil society actors at the United Nations in New York in June and July 2017.

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