Reducing the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons threat—the role of counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

2007 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control

Institutional Resilience, Deterrence and the Transition to Zero Nuclear Weapons

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 262-280
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Timely Manner ◽  
Shared Interest ◽  
Determining Factors ◽  
Institutional Cooperation ◽  
Factors Of Influence ◽  
Governing Institutions

The goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is directly related to the issues of international institutions and deterrence. Assuming that it would be possible, first, to move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons and then to zero nuclear weapons, governing institutions would have to be resilient enough to respond in a timely manner and to uphold the bargain. But what factors determine and influence institutional resilience? And what would be the likely role of deterrence? This article first assesses what the general ir narratives tell us about determining factors. It then examines two empirical cases from the realm of arms control institutions (the cfe and the npt treaties) and asks why these agreements are not as effective as intended. The next section discusses three additional factors of influence and identifies a shared interest in overcoming the deterrence principle as a key variable for institutional cooperation and as a factor that continues to influence resilience and effectiveness. The last section presents the conclusions.

scholarly journals Strategic stability and the possibilities of China's involvement in the strategic arms control negotiations

2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-708
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Cold War

Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Zagorski
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Delivery Systems ◽  
Future Role ◽  
The Past ◽  
Active Service ◽  
The Us ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Control Regime

AbstractRussia and the US have significantly reduced their tactical nuclear weapons over the past twenty years. The remaining weapons have been moved from active service and stored separate from their delivery systems. However, both still keep tactical nuclear weapons available for eventual deployment, and Moscow maintains not only a larger but also a much more diverse stockpile of such weapons than the US. The prospects for designing an arms control regime covering TNW are complicated by a series of factors. Technically, verifying any limitations or reductions of non-deployed weapons is an extremely sensitive and challenging task as it would require opening nuclear depots for inspection. Politically, the two countries differ in the assessment of a future role of nuclear arms. While the US anticipates that further development of its advanced conventional capabilities would lead to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, it is exactly the weakness of its conventional forces which causes the Russian defence establishment to project a growing role for nuclear weapons. These two distinct trajectories largely explain the differences in the two countries' approaches to the TNW arms control and make any agreement less likely to materialize any time soon. They also explain why Moscow has become increasingly sceptical with regard to including TNW within an arms control regime.

scholarly journals ‘Peace through strength’: Europe and NATO deterrence beyond the US Nuclear Posture Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-295
Author(s):  
Trevor McCrisken ◽  
Maxwell Downman
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
European Security ◽  
Alternative Vision ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
The Us

Abstract With its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration expanded the scope of US nuclear deterrence, re-emphasizing the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons, perceptively lowering the threshold for nuclear use and casting doubt on the future of arms control. The authors argue that these changes are consistent with the administration's wider ‘peace through strength’ approach that draws on traditional Republican thinking on security policy. While designed to demonstrate credibility and resolve to both allies and adversaries, however, this assertive approach to security policy and specifically nuclear policy as a necessary precursor to renewed engagement in strategic negotiations may have unintended consequences. This article focuses on European reactions to the strategy and argues that the Trump administration's nuclear posture challenges common European understandings in three principal areas. First, changes to US declaratory policy contest European assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons in defending NATO. Second, US modernization plans and their implications for intra-alliance relations risk accentuating controversial debates about the US commitment to Europe. Third, the apparent US rejection of arms control widens the scope for discord with European leaders. If European leaders assert a clear and credible alternative vision advocating nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control they could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia, demonstrating real strength and ultimately leading to more genuine opportunities for peace and sustainable European security.

A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Disarmament

2008 ◽  
pp. 286-299
Author(s):  
Keith Krause
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Land Mines ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Small Arms ◽  
The World ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
World Organization ◽  
Light Weapons

This article evaluates the achievements and limitations of the world organization in the field of disarmament. It stresses the role of the UN as part of the efforts to control arms as a way to achieve international peace and security. It also notes specific cases where progress was achieved or not, as well as the more recent efforts to handle the problems of anti-personnel land mines and small arms and light weapons. The article also tries to draw out some of the broader implications for international relations of the UN experience with formal multilateral arms control, among others.

Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America

1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Control Mechanism ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Free Zone ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

scholarly journals The Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s Early Cold War Strategies (1949–1957)

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Petra Kiss
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
Significant Factors

Since August 1945 atomic weapons have become significant factors in international relations, every state with great ambitions has aspired to get atomic secrets. The primary goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created in 1949 was – possessing the United States’, a nuclear power’s, security guarantee – to deter the Soviet agression. The first strategic documents of the Alliance were written with this very purpose. However, in the 1950s there was a shift in the allied nations’ policies, which influenced NATO’s strategic thinking as well, so in 1957 a real different strategic concept was adopted. Gaining technological superiority became the most important goal, which led to development and intense production of nuclear weapons. This article examines the emerging role of nuclear weapons and the changing strategy of the Alliance between 1949 and 1957.

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