Collective decision making reduces metacognitive control and increases error rates, particularly for overconfident individuals

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-375
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Blanchard ◽  
Simon A. Jackson ◽  
Sabina Kleitman
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiasha Saha Roy ◽  
Satyaki Mazumder ◽  
Koel Das

AbstractDecades of research on collective decision making has claimed that aggregated judgment of multiple individuals is more accurate than expert individual judgement. A longstanding problem in this regard has been to determine how decisions of individuals can be combined to form intelligent group decisions. Our study consisted of a random target detection task in natural scenes, where human subjects (18 subjects, 7 female) detected the presence or absence of a random target as indicated by the cue word displayed prior to stimulus display. Concurrently the neural activities (EEG signals) were recorded. A separate behavioural experiment was performed by different subjects (20 subjects, 11 female) on the same set of images to categorize the tasks according to their difficulty levels. We demonstrate that the weighted average of individual decision confidence/neural decision variables produces significantly better performance than the frequently used majority pooling algorithm. Further, the classification error rates from individual judgement were found to increase with increasing task difficulty. This error could be significantly reduced upon combining the individual decisions using group aggregation rules. Using statistical tests, we show that combining all available participants is unnecessary to achieve minimum classification error rate. We also try to explore if group aggregation benefits depend on the correlation between the individual judgements of the group and our results seem to suggest that reduced inter-subject correlation can improve collective decision making for a fixed difficulty level.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "


Author(s):  
Claire Taylor

The chapter examines a major corruption scandal that involved the Athenian orator Demosthenes and an official of Alexander the Great. This episode reveals how tensions between individual and collective decision-making practices shaped Athenian understandings of corruption and anticorruption. The various and multiple anticorruption measures of Athens sought to bring ‘hidden’ knowledge into the open and thereby remove information from the realm of individual judgment, placing it instead into the realm of collective judgment. The Athenian experience therefore suggests that participatory democracy, and a civic culture that fosters political equality rather than reliance on individual expertise, provides a key bulwark against corruption.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.


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