scholarly journals The Bargaining-sales-delegation Game

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. 857-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Luca Gori ◽  
Mauro Sodini
Keyword(s):  
Delegation Game ◽  
Sales Delegation

scholarly journals The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 1325-1359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Fehr ◽  
Holger Herz ◽  
Tom Wilkening
Keyword(s):  
Economic Life ◽  
Large Percentage ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Incentive Effects ◽  
Delegation Game

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)

Costs of Sales Forces, Substitution between Competing Products, and Vertical Integration Decisions

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chung-Hui Chou
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Vertical Structure ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Vertical Merger ◽  
Policy Relevance ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Sales Forces ◽  
Sales Delegation

Abstract This paper analyzes duopolistic firms’ vertical integration decisions with considering costs of sales forces and sales delegation under vertical integration. The main contribution of our research is showing that full vertical integration (separation) is more common when competing products are highly (weakly) substitutable. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, an asymmetric vertical structure may not only be an equilibrium outcome but may also be optimal for consumers’ surplus in spite of yielding higher retail prices than those arising under full vertical integration. We also examine the impacts of vertical structures on welfare which have vertical merger policy relevance. First, when products are weakly substitutable, keeping vertical merger costs low may induce full vertical integration to be an equilibrium outcome which optimizes consumers’ surplus and social welfare simultaneously. Second, imposing a vertical merger tax increasing with substitution between products on firms may induce firms’ vertical integration decisions to be optimal for social welfare.

R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

2006 ◽  
Vol 27 (7) ◽  
pp. 605-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kopel ◽  
Christian Riegler
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Delegation ◽  
Delegation Game

scholarly journals ‘Green’ managerial delegation theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Domenico Buccella ◽  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Luca Gori
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Quality ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
The Public ◽  
Emissions Tax ◽  
The Government ◽  
Delegation Game ◽  
Profit Maximisation

Abstract This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between GD and SD and then contrasts them also with profit maximisation (PM). A plethora of Nash equilibria emerges, especially in the case GD versus PM (the ‘green delegation game’), depending on the public awareness toward environmental quality, ranging from the coordination game to the ‘green’ prisoner's dilemma. Second, though the contract under GD incentivises managers for emissions, the environmental damage is lower than under SD. This is because the optimal tax more than compensates the incentive for emissions. These findings suggest that designing GD contracts paradoxically favours environmental quality.

scholarly journals Competitive CSR in a strategic managerial delegation game with a multiproduct corporation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arturo Garcia ◽  
Mariel Leal ◽  
Sang-Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Delegation ◽  
Delegation Game

Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoya Tajika
Keyword(s):  
Quadratic Function ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Reaction Functions ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Delegation Game ◽  
Regular Equilibrium ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Action Profile

AbstractThis study examines delegation games in which each player commits to a reaction function in advance. We focus on the regular subgame perfect equilibria of delegation games in the sense that the chosen reaction functions have an invertible Jacobian. Subsequently we provide a necessary condition under which an action profile is achieved as a regular equilibrium of n-player delegation games. In two-player games with misaligned preferences, each efficient action profile violates the necessary condition. We also show that almost action profiles other than efficient ones are achieved as regular equilibria of the delegation game in which the chosen reaction functions are linear. This finding implies that each delegatee’s objective is written as a quadratic function, which may justify the linear-quadratic specification of the objective functions in applications.

Maximum-revenue versus Optimum-welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game

2008 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 080522033835317-???
Author(s):  
Roger Clarke ◽  
David R. Collie
Keyword(s):  
Export Taxes ◽  
Delegation Game

The equivalence of supporting software delegation and sales delegation

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 526-529
Author(s):  
Chung‐Hui Chou
Keyword(s):  
Sales Delegation
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document