Continental Counterparts to the Anglo-American Concept of the Harm Principle

2007 ◽  
pp. 95-125
Author(s):  
Nina Peršak
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
American Concept ◽  
The Harm Principle

From the harm principle to harm decisionism: Hart, Feinberg, and the eclipse of Millian ambiguity

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-211
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Harcourt
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Simple Sentence ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Harm Principle

This simple sentence from John Stuart Mill’s “Introductory” to On Liberty—pulled out of context and denuded of Mill’s sophisticated philosophical treatment—became a foundational reference of Anglo-American criminal law and helped shape the course of penal legislation, enforcement, and theory during the twenteith century.

The Limits of Criminal Misconduct

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Role Theory ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Public Office ◽  
The Harm Principle

I turn my attention to the theoretical or moral justification for the offence of misconduct in public office. I argue that the offence of misconduct in office is only tenuously connected to the ‘harm principle’ justification for criminalization. I suggest that the offence is better explained by what I call the ‘role’ theory of criminalization. I also consider the legitimate scope of the offence: the kinds of misconduct that it should, and should not, cover. In that regard, we will see that codes of conduct that govern officials—a vital written element to the UK’s constitution—play a role not merely in setting boundaries but also in minimizing rule of law uncertainty about the kind of misconduct that may be found to fall within the scope of the offence.

scholarly journals Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti ◽  
Federica Liveriero
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Social Tolerance ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Harm Principle

AbstractTraditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.

scholarly journals The harm principle and the greatest happiness principle: the missing link

2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (129) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Cinara Nahra
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Missing Link ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Legal Force ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible.

PLASTIC TREES AND GLADIATORS: LIBERALISM AND AESTHETIC REGULATION

Legal Theory ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
Legal Moralism ◽  
Joel Feinberg ◽  
The Harm Principle

The hallmark of modern liberalism is its embrace of the Millian harm principle and its antipathy to legal moralism. In this article I consider whether aesthetic regulations can be justified under the harm principle as that principle has been elaborated by Joel Feinberg. I conclude that aesthetic and other regulations that most liberals regard as unproblematic are actually instances of legal moralism.

Collateral Consequences and Criminalization

2019 ◽  
pp. 209-222
Author(s):  
Zachary Hoskins
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
The State ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Legal Moralism ◽  
Collateral Consequences ◽  
Legal Consequences ◽  
The Harm Principle

This chapter examines the implications of the existence of collateral legal consequences (CLCs) for decisions about what types of conduct the state should, or may, criminalize. It might seem that criminalization decisions should not be concerned with CLCs: it is one question what sort of conduct the state should declare to be criminal behavior, and a separate question what consequences should follow for those who violate criminal laws. But this chapter contends that the existence of CLCs is relevant according to specific accounts of criminalization, namely versions of the harm principle and legal moralism. It is also relevant to the legitimacy of the state more generally. Thus the existence of CLCs is relevant both to officials who make criminalization decisions and to scholars assessing competing theories of criminalization.

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