scholarly journals The harm principle and the greatest happiness principle: the missing link

2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (129) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Cinara Nahra
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Missing Link ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Legal Force ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible.

Deontological Principles

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Positive Duties ◽  
Negative Duties ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Harm Principle

This chapter considers the harm principle. According to this principle, our negative duties not to harm people are much stronger than our positive duties to make things go better by saving people from being harmed. One of two duties would be stronger in the cost-requiring sense if we would be morally required to bear greater burdens, if that were necessary, to fulfil this duty. One of two duties would be stronger in the conflict-of-duty sense if this duty would be stronger than the other when these duties conflict. Our negative duties not to harm people may be much stronger in the cost-requiring sense than our positive duties to save people from being harmed. But these negative duties are not, this chapter argues, much stronger in the conflict-of-duty sense.

scholarly journals Well-Being, the Self, and Radical Change

2019 ◽  
pp. 251-270
Author(s):  
Jennifer Hawkins
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Change ◽  
Future Time ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Subject

Chapter 12 explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of radical change are intuitively prudentially good, many cases of really radical change are not. Yet FBR has trouble explaining this. Many people instinctively reach for the notion of identity to solve this problem—arguing that really radical change cannot be good because it alters who someone is. Yet, as the chapter argues, there are reasons to doubt that appeals to identity are appropriate. The chapter ends with the suggestion that prudential facts may explain why and when retaining identity matters, rather than the other way around, and points to a possible way forward for a theorist of welfare committed to FBR.

scholarly journals Self-Other Asymmetry

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Ruwen Ogien
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
Global Evaluation ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Standard Objection ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly with the “Harm principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not coherent.

scholarly journals Fair-minded critical thinking: Towards a reconciliation of the self and the other

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-61
Author(s):  
M. Adeyinka Akapo ◽  
◽  
J. Tunde Akande ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Relations ◽  
Missing Link ◽  
Man And Nature ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Meaningful Measure

This work examines the role which fair-minded critical thinking can play in the attempt to reconcile the self with the other. It argues that much of the problems encountered in human relations arise from either uncritical thinking or unfair-minded critical thinking. This happens as a result of the enthronement of both the individual and social ego, on account of the weakening of the fair-minded critical thinking faculty on the one hand, and the strengthening of that of the unfair-minded critical thinking, on the other. The overall result of this is the lack of peace and cooperation among men as well as between man and nature. This work, therefore, identifies fair-minded critical thinking as a missing link in previous attempts to reconcile the self with the other and recommends its cultivation as a veritable tool for the achievement of any meaningful measure of success in such attempts at reconciliation. It also shows how much humanity stands to benefit from the conscious and deliberate cultivation of the principles of fair-mindedness in all relations between the self and the other. The work adopts critical analysis in its discourse.

Providing Freshmen with a Good “Starting-Block”

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 69-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikaël De Clercq ◽  
Charlotte Michel ◽  
Sophie Remy ◽  
Benoît Galand
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Student Adjustment ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Pivotal Phase ◽  
Study Program ◽  
Study Task ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Belonging ◽  
Intention To Persist

Abstract. Grounded in social-psychological literature, this experimental study assessed the effects of two so-called “wise” interventions implemented in a student study program. The interventions took place during the very first week at university, a presumed pivotal phase of transition. A group of 375 freshmen in psychology were randomly assigned to three conditions: control, social belonging, and self-affirmation. Following the intervention, students in the social-belonging condition expressed less social apprehension, a higher social integration, and a stronger intention to persist one month later than the other participants. They also relied more on peers as a source of support when confronted with a study task. Students in the self-affirmation condition felt more self-affirmed at the end of the intervention but didn’t benefit from other lasting effects. The results suggest that some well-timed and well-targeted “wise” interventions could provide lasting positive consequences for student adjustment. The respective merits of social-belonging and self-affirmation interventions are also discussed.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

Don’t Put Me in This Group

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-93
Author(s):  
Jort de Vreeze ◽  
Christina Matschke
Keyword(s):  
Positive Emotions ◽  
Negative Emotions ◽  
Negative Information ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Group Memberships

Abstract. Not all group memberships are self-chosen. The current research examines whether assignments to non-preferred groups influence our relationship with the group and our preference for information about the ingroup. It was expected and found that, when people are assigned to non-preferred groups, they perceive the group as different to the self, experience negative emotions about the assignment and in turn disidentify with the group. On the other hand, when people are assigned to preferred groups, they perceive the group as similar to the self, experience positive emotions about the assignment and in turn identify with the group. Finally, disidentification increases a preference for negative information about the ingroup.

From Container to Claustrum: Projective Identification in Couples

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamara Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Health ◽  
Projective Identification ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intimate Partners ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
As If

This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the role of projective identification in understanding couples' dynamics. Projective identification as a defence is well suited to couples, as intimate partners provide an ideal location to deposit unwanted parts of the self. This paper illustrates how projective identification functions differently depending on the psychological health of the couple. It elucidates how healthier couples use projective identification more as a form of communication, whereas disturbed couples are inclined to employ it to invade and control the other, as captured by Meltzer's concept of "intrusive identification". These different uses of projective identification affect couples' capacities to provide what Bion called "containment". In disturbed couples, partners serve as what Meltzer termed "claustrums" whereby projections are not contained, but imprisoned or entombed in the other. Applying the concept of claustrum helps illuminate common feelings these couples express, such as feeling suffocated, stifled, trapped, held hostage, or feeling as if the relationship is killing them. Finally, this paper presents treatment challenges in working with more disturbed couples.

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