The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can refer to.

The ‘Harm Principle’ and Information Disorder Online

Misinformation propagation in its current form is a global problem that requires urgent solutions. Historically, instances of misinformation publicly propagated can be found as far back as the sixth century AD.Scholars and researchers have generally settled for a definition of ‘information disorder’ that reveals three variants: misinformation, disinformation and malinformation. What should be of paramount importance, in the fight against information disorders, is the potential of false information to cause harm. The ‘harm principle’ was proposed by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in 1859 and needs an upgrade for the social media age. One such upgrade is proposed by Cass Sunstein.

Making the ‘Harm Principle’ Central to Approaches Against Information Disorder

Misinformation online is an urgent global challenge. Such is the gravity of the challenge, and its effect on global collective behaviour, there are calls for social media/information disorder to be designated a “crisis discipline” along with medicine, conservation biology and climate science. Scholars have generally settled for a definition of ‘information disorder’ that reveals three variants: misinformation, disinformation and malinformation. What should be of paramount importance, in the fight against information disorder, is the potential of falsehood to cause harm. This potential for harm must be the litmus test distinguishing free speech and speech that should not be free. The ‘harm principle’ proposed by John Stuart Mill is more than 150 years old and needs an upgrade for the social media age. One such upgrade is proposed by Cass Sunstein. We summarize different approaches to analysing online information disorder. We conclude that approaches which emphasize analytical and critical thinking are important but have shortcomings. When analysing complex phenomena like conspiracy theories a ‘systems’ approach is more effective to reveal root causes of information disorder, provide actionable insight and long-term solutions.

2. What is ‘crime’?

This chapter discusses what crime is. No matter how universally its ideas and regulations are accepted, it is important to understand and not lose sight of the fact that crime is a social construct. Because crime is socially constructed, ideas of unacceptable and criminal behaviour alter across cultures and over time. Many suggest that what is known as the ‘harm principle’ might be the best standard by which we should decide whether an activity should be criminal. This principle holds that if conduct is not harmful to others it should not be criminal, even if others strongly dislike it. The chapter also looks at the concept of deviance and identifies: what kinds of activities are disapproved of (seen as deviant) and why; which of these are criminalised and why; what the criminal law may reveal about society and what matters to it.

Should market harms be an exception to the Harm Principle?

Many proponents of the Harm Principle seem to implicitly assume that the principle is compatible with permitting the free exchange of goods and services, even if such exchanges generate so-called market harms. I argue that, as a result, proponents of the Harm Principle face a dilemma: either the Harm Principle’s domain cannot include a large number of non-market harm cases or market harms must be treated on par with non-market harms. I then go on to discuss three alternative arguments defending the status of market harms as exceptions to the Harm Principle and discuss why these arguments also fail.

Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security

Traditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.

Mill on the Liberty of Thought and Discussion

This chapter discuses Chapter Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, ‘On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, which is the best-known defence of free speech in the philosophical canon. It suggests that Mill’s argument in chapter two of On Liberty is a distinctively epistemic argument, and one which relies on a specific conception of man’s cognitive nature and the character of human knowledge. There is a strong connection between Mill’s Freedom of Discussion Principle and the way in which human beings come to know the world. The chapter then identifies what Mill means to rule out by his argument—what, in short, freedom of discussion is freedom from—and what he means to rule in. It also considers the relation between the Freedom of Discussion Principle and its better known sibling, the Harm Principle, and the conditions under which these principles are applicable.