Strategy Implementation versus Middle Management Self-interest

1989 ◽  
pp. 307-321
Author(s):  
William D. Guth ◽  
Ian C. Macmillan
1986 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 313-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Guth ◽  
Ian C. Macmillan

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. e0249246
Author(s):  
Kornelis F. van den Oever

This paper studies whether demographic similarities between middle and top managers with different tasks (strategy formation and strategy implementation) impacts organizational performance. By drawing on relational demography theory, we investigate the effect of similarity in gender, organizational tenure, and in both these demographics on the overall costs of Dutch municipalities. The main findings of this paper show that the similarity effects are interrelated: when middle and top managers diverge on only one demographic, performance is increased. Also, when leaders are similar on both demographics, performance is impaired. We conclude by discussing the implications for the literature on middle management, relational demography, and strategy formation and implementation.


Author(s):  
Jan Kiehne ◽  
Ioana Ceausu ◽  
Ann-Katrin Arp ◽  
Timm Schüler

Abstract The ability of businesses to adapt their strategy quickly and effectively to the changing environment in an ever more globalized economy has become one of the key success factors for sustainable competitive advantage and above average economic returns. Success factor oriented research has identified a number of obstacles that hinder effective strategy implementation and there is growing support in the research community that the behavior of middle management, who frequently take on key positions in strategy implementation projects, is of significant importance for success or failure. However, most studies have looked at the issue from a descriptive perspective, only few have analyzed the role of middle management from a normative viewpoint. This study builds upon Porter and Lawler’s qualitative model of managerial motivation which is transformed into a quantitative principal agent model to analyze the behavior of middle managers as key actors in executing strategic projects. The analysis highlights the necessity of adequate incentive systems for strategy implementation projects. Further, the importance of managing both objective and perceived implementation risk is demonstrated. Finally, the authors suggest distinguishing obstacles of strategy implementation into process issues and behavioral issues.


Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  

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