scholarly journals A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems

2009 ◽  
pp. 375-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Faliszewski ◽  
Edith Hemaspaandra ◽  
Lane A. Hemaspaandra ◽  
Jörg Rothe
Keyword(s):  
Election Systems

scholarly journals Between legitimacy and efficacy: reform in presidential election systems in Latin America

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (se) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Buquet ◽  
Lucía Tiscorniay ◽  
Mateo Porciúncula
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Election Systems

Election systems and electoral reform

2003 ◽  
pp. 88-98
Author(s):  
Bill Coxall ◽  
Lynton Robins ◽  
Robert Leach
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Election Systems

Election Systems and the Representation of Black Women in American State Legislatures

1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Darcy ◽  
Charles D. Hadley ◽  
Jason F. Kirksey
Keyword(s):  
Black Women ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Election Systems ◽  
American State

Electoral Change in the United States and Great Britain

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Boyd
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
The United States ◽  
Electoral Change ◽  
American Elections ◽  
The Government ◽  
Election Systems

Major inter-election vote shifts are characteristic of present-day American and British elections. In American elections since 1960 the presidency has changed parties on four of the six occasions. In British elections since 1959 the government has changed parties on four of the eight occasions. Students of both election systems ask whether these large and frequent shifts portend either major realignments or the weakening of the parties. The purpose of this Note is to analyse inter-election changes in the United States and Great Britain and to highlight and explain their differences.

US poll security will likely still be issue in 2020

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Election Systems ◽  
Media Firms

Significance The bill will move to the Senate, where Republicans fear it over-reaches into states’ powers to manage elections. The standoff takes place within the context of the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, in which Russians interfered via informational techniques and social media. The bill is designed to prevent another such occurrence, but the ability for actors to manipulate election results is more far-reaching than the methods addressed in this bill. Impacts The bill would authorise federal money annually to improve and maintain states’ election systems. Social media firms will face more government and public pressure to prevent foreign election interference via their platforms. Social media firms will find it difficult to police their platforms without increasing editorial control.

scholarly journals Design and Implementation a Smart E-Voting Model : Decentralization Using Blockchain

2019 ◽  
pp. 109-114
Author(s):  
Shantanu bindewari ◽  
Jayesh Surana
Keyword(s):  
Research Work ◽  
Consensus Protocol ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Direct Election ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Hash Algorithm ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Block Chain ◽  
Election Systems ◽  
Voting Model

The transparency of the block-chain allows more auditing and considerate of elections. These attributes are particular of the necessities of a voting system. These features derive from decentralized network, and can bring additional democratic processes to elections, particularly to direct election systems. For e-voting to develop further open, transparent, and independently auditable, a possible resolution would be base it on blockchain technology. In this research work to proposed technique for voting system using blockchain. The blockchain will be publicly provable and distributed in a method that no one will be intelligent to corrupt it. In this research work proposed a blockchain-based model with Consensus Protocol and SHA256 hash algorithm related with the priorities of the ballot-privacy, veri?ability, suitability, extensiveness, uniqueness, sturdiness, and coercion- resistance.

scholarly journals Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 275-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Faliszewski ◽  
E. Hemaspaandra ◽  
L. A. Hemaspaandra ◽  
J. Rothe
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Network Flow ◽  
Np Hard ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
External Agent ◽  
Fixed Parameter ◽  
Election System ◽  
Election Systems ◽  
The Given ◽  
Flexible Models

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate's victory. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NP-hard to recognize the inputs on which the agent can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^\alpha, where the parameter \alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive control scenario, we determine which of resistance or vulnerability holds for Copeland^\alpha for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1. In particular, we prove that Copeland^{0.5}, the system commonly referred to as ``Copeland voting,'' provides full resistance to constructive control, and we prove the same for Copeland^\alpha, for all rational \alpha, 0 < \alpha < 1. Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control. In addition, we prove that both Copeland^0 and Copeland^1 (interestingly, Copeland^1 is an election system developed by the thirteenth-century mystic Llull) are resistant to all standard types of constructive control other than one variant of addition of candidates. Moreover, we show that for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1, Copeland^\alpha voting is fully resistant to bribery attacks, and we establish fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control for Copeland^\alpha. We also study Copeland^\alpha elections under more flexible models such as microbribery and extended control, we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results, and we prove our results in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. Our vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.

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