Global Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality

2000 ◽  
pp. 361-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gian Italo Bischi ◽  
Ahmad Naimzada
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Global Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

A Dynamic Duopoly Game with Content Providers’ Bounded Rationality

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (07) ◽  
pp. 2050095 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mostafa Jourhmane
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two content providers (CPs). Competition between two CPs is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and the credibility of content they offer. According to the CPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both CPs are bounded rational. Each CP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamical system induced by bounded rationality, and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.

The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi-Qing Song ◽  
Wei-li Zhang ◽  
Yi-Rong Jiang ◽  
Juan Geng
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stationary Points ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Demand Elasticities ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

AbstractIn a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.

(Un)Bounded Rationality

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Donald E. Broadbent
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality

Local and global analysis of plasticity in ferritic-austenitic duplex steels

2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (PR5) ◽  
pp. Pr5-293-Pr5-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. V. Silberschmidt ◽  
M. Ortmayr ◽  
C. Messner ◽  
E. A. Werner
Keyword(s):  
Global Analysis ◽  
Duplex Steels

Global Analysis of Host Tissue Gene Expression in the Invasive Front of Colorectal Liver Metastases

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
K Brand ◽  
OR Bandapalli ◽  
C Franke ◽  
D Kobelt ◽  
K Kühnle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Gene Expression ◽  
Liver Metastases ◽  
Colorectal Liver Metastases ◽  
Global Analysis ◽  
Host Tissue ◽  
Invasive Front ◽  
Tissue Gene Expression

Do remittances differ depending on migration pathway and length of stay?

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-118
Author(s):  
Anita Pugliese ◽  
Julie Ray ◽  
Neli Esipova
Keyword(s):  
Length Of Stay ◽  
First Generation ◽  
Second Generation ◽  
Global Analysis ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Migration Pathway ◽  
First Generation Migrants ◽  
Second Generation Migrants

This paper reports the results from Gallup’s global analysis of the likelihood of first-generation migrants, second-generation migrants and the native-born to send financial help in the form of money or goods to others inside or outside their respective country of residence. The findings in this paper are based on more than 450,000 interviews conducted through Gallup’s World Poll in 157 countries in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The sample includes more than 26,000 first-generation migrants and more than 20,000 second-generation migrants. The large sample enables Gallup to analyze first-generation migrants by the duration of their stay in their adopted country and compare their remittance behaviors with second-generation migrants and the native-born.

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