(Un)Bounded Rationality

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Donald E. Broadbent
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Joshua M. Epstein

This part describes the agent-based and computational model for Agent_Zero and demonstrates its capacity for generative minimalism. It first explains the replicability of the model before offering an interpretation of the model by imagining a guerilla war like Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, where events transpire on a 2-D population of contiguous yellow patches. Each patch is occupied by a single stationary indigenous agent, which has two possible states: inactive and active. The discussion then turns to Agent_Zero's affective component and an elementary type of bounded rationality, as well as its social component, with particular emphasis on disposition, action, and pseudocode. Computational parables are then presented, including a parable relating to the slaughter of innocents through dispositional contagion. This part also shows how the model can capture three spatially explicit examples in which affect and probability change on different time scales.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Grossmann ◽  
Richard Eibach

Previous theory and research on bounded rationality has emphasized how limited cognitive resources constrain people from making utility maximizing choices. This paper expands the concept of bounded rationality to consider how people’s rationality may be constrained by their internalization of a qualitatively distinct standard for sound judgment, which is commonly labeled reasonableness. In contrast to rationality, the standard of reasonableness provides guidance for making choices in situations that involve balancing incommensurable values and interests or reconciling conflicting points-of-view. We review recent evidence showing that laypeople readily recognize the distinctions between rationality and reasonableness and thus are able to utilize these as distinct standards to inform their everyday decision-making. The fact that people appear to have internalized rationality and reasonableness as distinct standards of sound judgment supports the notion that people’s pursuit of rationality may be bounded by their determination to also be reasonable.


Author(s):  
John Sterman ◽  
Rebecca M. Henderson ◽  
Eric D. Beinhocker ◽  
Lee I. Newman

Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. The book surveys the entire body of psychological research underpinning behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluates the core methodological questions of this area of research. The book then discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for establishing the aims of legislation, and the means of attaining them. This is followed by a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law—property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law—as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document