A Structured Incentive System for Re-Entry Clients

1981 ◽  
pp. 479-483
Author(s):  
Don Russakoff ◽  
Robert W. Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Incentive System

Effects of Accounting-Method Choices on Subjective Performance-Measure Weighting Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Precision and Error Covariance

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 1163-1192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjani Krishnan ◽  
Joan L. Luft ◽  
Michael D. Shields
Keyword(s):  
Performance Measures ◽  
Error Variance ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Error Covariance ◽  
Psychology Theory ◽  
Optimal Weighting ◽  
Similarity And Difference

Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.

Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 145-180
Author(s):  
Evan Ackiron
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Programs ◽  
The Past ◽  
Research And Innovation ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
Necessary Evil ◽  
Near Future

Patents and other statutory types of market protections are used in the United States to promote scientific research and innovation. This incentive is especially important in research intensive fields such as the pharmaceutical industry. Unfortunately, these same protections often result in higher monopoly pricing once a successful product is brought to market. Usually this consequence is viewed as the necessary evil of an incentive system that encourages costly research and development by promising large rewards to the successful inventor. However, in the case of the AIDS drug Zidovudine (AZT), the high prices charged by the pharmaceutical company owning the drug have led to public outcry and a re-examination of government incentive systems.This Note traces the evolution of these incentive programs — the patent system, and, to a lesser extent, the orphan drug program — and details the conflicting interests involved in their development. It then demonstrates how the AZT problem brings the interest of providing inventors with incentives for risky innovative efforts into a sharp collision with the ultimate goal of such systems: ensuring that the public has access to the resulting products at a reasonable price. Finally, the Note describes how Congress and the courts have attempted to resolve these problems in the past, and how they might best try to solve the AZT problem in the near future.

An Evidence-Based Incentive System for Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program

2012 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 1092-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald K. K. Lee ◽  
Stefanos A. Zenios
Keyword(s):  
Renal Disease ◽  
End Stage Renal Disease ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
Stage Renal Disease ◽  
End Stage

Web-Based Agent Incentive System Using Role-based Algorithm with SMS Notification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike-khem Suazo ◽  
Jeramae Penales ◽  
April Jay Diolata ◽  
Noel Sobejana
Keyword(s):  
Incentive System ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Role Based ◽  
Sms Notification

DISTRIBUTION INCENTIVE SYSTEM FOR ELECTRICAL COMPANIES

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 43-48
Author(s):  
Yu. V. NIKITOCHKINA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Method ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
New Model ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Commercial Enterprise ◽  
Product Image

This article proposes a new model for stimulating distributors – a multi-stage scale that compares the distributor's rating with the percentage level of discount for regional coverage and specialization. The list of indicators for calculating discounts by specialization and regional coverage includes a group of indicators to increase the motivation of the distributor to improve the quality of their work and a group of indicators to increase the motivation of the distributor to expand the scope of action. Using the method of index grouping of expert estimates, the weight values of each indicator were found. The task of calculating the evaluation of the results of the distribution was set as a multi-criteria task, in which the additive optimization method was used for the procedure of folding private criteria, which was preceded by checking all private criteria for addi-tive independence. The developed incentive model can be adapted for any commercial enterprise interested in promoting its product through regional coverage, as well as in supporting the product image, which, of course, contributes to stimulating demand and increasing sales.

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