Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union

Coalition formation and eastward expansion of the european union (implications for the council)

Prague Economic Papers ◽

10.18267/j.pep.168 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Peter Silárszky ◽

René Levínský

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Coalition Formation ◽

Cooperative Games ◽

Power Index ◽

Decision Making Process ◽

Eastern European ◽

The European Union ◽

Distribution Of Power ◽

Eastern European Countries ◽

The Eu

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the implications of coalition formation and the entry of some Central and Eastern European countries on the voting power of the member states. The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyze the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.

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United in fear: Interest group coalition formation as a weapon of the weak?

European Union Politics ◽

10.1177/1465116518824022 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 20 (2) ◽

pp. 198-218 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Marcel Hanegraaff ◽

Andrea Pritoni

Keyword(s):

At Risk ◽

European Union ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Interest Groups ◽

Interest Group ◽

Coalition Formation ◽

Theoretical Framework ◽

European Countries ◽

Coalition Building ◽

The European Union

Although many interest groups work together perpetually, most academic studies agree that coalition formation does not lead to more influence. In this article, we try to explain these puzzling findings. While former research generally tends to frame the decision of forming an interest group coalition as a strength, in this paper, we argue that coalition building should be considered as a ‘weapon of the weak’. Interest groups fearing that they are insufficiently influential, and whose very existence as an organisation is at risk, are more likely to coalesce. This theoretical framework is tested on a sample of around 3000 interest groups in six European countries – Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden – and the European Union. Empirical findings clearly demonstrate that perceived fears – oriented towards both organisational survival and policy influence – have an effect on how likely it is that an interest group will decide to build a coalition.

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